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Abstract
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT THE HOSPITAL READMISSION RATE PROGRAM
AND VALUE BASED PURCHASING HAS HAD ON THE FINANCIAL VIABILITY OF
ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTERS, 2011 TO 2015.
By David Whitfield Allen, MAcc
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2019
Major Director: Gloria Bazzoli, Ph.D.
Bon Secours Professor
Department of Health Administration
Academic Health Centers (AHCs) hold a unique place in today’s health care
environment. They service their communities through a tripartite mission of education,
research, and provision of complex care to disadvantaged populations. To achieve this
mission, AHCs face challenges in funding and cost containment compared to nonAHCs. Additionally, the implementation of government programs like the Hospital
Readmission Rate Program (HRRP) and Value Based Purchasing (VBP) have the
potential to affect AHCs differently from non-AHCs. While AHC’s unique features are
known and there has been research to date on HRRP and VBP, literature has yet to
statistically explore the financial differences between AHCs and non-AHCs and how
HRRP and VBP may have differentially affected AHCs compared to non-AHCs.
The objectives of this study are to explore financial differences between AHCs
and non-AHCs and the impact that HRRP and VBP has had on these two types of
organizations through the use of a contingency theory framework. Contingency theory is

an organizational theory that seeks to explain variations in organizational performance
over time by studying internal and external environmental influences.
Guided by Contingency Theory, the study used a non-randomized, quasiexperimental, retrospective study design to evaluate two hypotheses. The study sample
consisted of a total of 10,157 (991 AHCs) US non-rural hospital years from 2011
through 2015. The study used operating margin and total margin as the key measures
of hospital financial performance for the dependent variables. HRRP and VBP were
combined into a single independent variable along with hospital type differentiating
AHCs from non-AHCs. Covariates of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, Medicaid expansion,
health system affiliation, and ownership structure were used to control for other
environmental influences. A repeated measure analysis of variance was employed to
test the difference between the two hospital groups in isolation of HRRP, VBP, and
covariates and a repeated measure analysis of variance with covariance was used to
test the full model, which incorporated HRRP, VBP, and covariates. The results of the
analysis support the significance of HRRP and VBP on hospital operating margin, but
the results did not support a differential effect of these programs on AHCs as compared
to non-AHCs.
While the results did not support the two main hypotheses, it did provide valuable
insight into the financial differences between AHCs and non-AHCs and the importance
of VBP and HRRP on hospital financial performance. The results also provide important
policy implications and thoughts on potential managerial actions given the HRRP and
VBP programs.

Chapter 1: Introduction
The Study Problem
Academic Health Centers (AHCs), a critical part of the healthcare infrastructure,
are the only healthcare organizations explicitly tasked with the tripartite mission
to advance science, educate providers, and provide complex care to disadvantaged
populations. To support their mission, they rely on a combination of government funding
and health insurance recovery (Statista, 2018). Recently, financial penalties threaten
their financial margin, and to borrow a phrase commonly repeated in hospitals and the
nonprofit health sector, with no margin there is no mission. Two recent Medicare
payment adjustment programs, the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP)
and Value Based Purchasing (VBP), could substantially affect the viability of these
healthcare providers. Although both HRRP and VBP affect hospitals and their margins
in similar ways, HRRP is a penalty focused on excess hospital readmission, whereas
VBP applies an across-the-board payment reduction with the possibility of a payback
based on achieving certain metrics. With the implementation of the HRRP, all hospitals
face up to a 3% penalty on all Medicare reimbursement for high readmission rates,
whereas VBP reduces all Medicare payments by 2%, with a potential payback of 3%
(Morse, 2016). Although much of the research on HRRP and VBP has focused on their
financial impact on all U.S. based hospitals, the unique impact these programs have
had on AHCs has not been examined.
This study uses previous methods and approaches to review and analyze
hospital profitability around government programs to determine the impact of these
programs on AHCs. On average, AHCs depend on government funding, such as
Medicare, for more than 50% of their total net patient revenues, compared to the
1

national average for hospitals, which was 40.2% in 2014 (Statista, 2018). A lack of
research to understand the unique impact HRRP and VBP could have on AHCs
compared to non-AHCs may leave AHCs facing financial hardship from these programs
more than conventional community hospitals.
This study will provide valuable insight into the financial impact and performance
of AHCs under HRRP and VBP. This will be accomplished through regression analyses
to explore if AHCs have been differently affected compared to non-AHCs through
financial margin. The expected outcome is the statistically larger negative impact on
AHCs’ total and operating margins compared to non-AHCs. It is expected that the
decline in operating and total margins is due to the increasing nature of the HRRP
penalties from 1% to 3% from 2013 through 2015 and the VBP payment reduction of
2% offset by hospitals’ opportunities to increase their incentive payments up to 3%. The
outcome of this research will assist policymakers and AHCs in understanding how
penalties have affected AHCs’ historical financial performance.
Background
The AHC mission is critical to the success of the U.S. healthcare system, but it is
expensive to fund. AHCs have been found to be 80% costlier than non-teaching
community hospitals, with an average cost $676 higher per patient case than non-AHCs
(Reuter, 1997). The higher cost is a product of the patient populations they serve and
the increased costs related to resident education. Although AHCs only represent 5% of
all US hospitals, they provide 37% of all charity care, 26% of all Medicaid
hospitalizations, and receive 38% of transfers from other hospitals that cannot care for
patients with complex needs (Grover, Slavin, & Willson, 2014). This patient
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responsibility is often coupled with a regional safety net designation, with AHCs
maintaining nearly 80% of regional standby services, such as level 1-trauma centers.
The ability to provide such complex and expensive services to a population that is often
disadvantaged creates financial pressures. AHCs rely on patient care revenue to a large
degree to support these critical areas; however, the care they provide and the
populations they serve do not provide high levels of revenue above the cost of care
(Reuter & Gaskin, 1997).
The American Hospital Association found that in 2015, Medicaid and Medicare
reimbursements to hospitals were $57.8 billion under the cost of providing that care
(Belliveau, 2016). The combination of high reliance on low paying populations and the
need to provide expensive care in addition to their educational mission makes AHC
reliance on government payers and programs all the more concerning. This concern
stems from AHCs’ financial susceptibility to changes in government policies and the
introduction of new payment programs.
HRRP and VBP are two such programs that significantly affect the payments to
all hospitals for Medicare services. HRRP is a set of penalties that are assessed on
hospitals for excess hospital readmissions within 30 days of a Medicare patient’s
discharge. Once the penalty rates are calculated, they are applied to all Medicare
payments for each hospital. The penalties started at 1% of all Medicare payments for a
hospital in fiscal year 2013, then increased to 2% in year two, and 3% in year three
(Boccuti & Casillas, 2017). The penalties have had a sizeable impact, costing hospitals
$290 million in 2013 and $528 million in 2017 (Boccuti & Casillas, 2017). Research has
shown that HRRP has impacted the majority of hospitals in the United States. In 2016,
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only 799 hospitals of the 3,400 hospitals, less than a quarter, were not assessed
penalties under the program (Rice, 2015).
VBP is foundationally different from HRRP. VBP is not a penalty but a reduction
in total payments by 2% that could then be earned back based on a hospital’s
performance on several key metrics. Hospitals can earn back a percentage of total
payments, up to approximately 3%. The law states that the 2% collected is to be
redistributed back to the highest performing hospitals in the program. The 2% reduction
generated around $1.9 billion for payments in 2018 (CMS C, 2017). Overall,
approximately 2,955 hospitals were part of the program in 2017, declining to 2,808 in
2018 (Castellucci, 2017). Around half of these hospitals saw little change in
reimbursement, receiving payments and penalties between -.5 to .5% of Medicare
payments (Castellucci, 2017). The highest performing hospitals saw a 3% increase,
whereas the lowest performing facilities saw a net loss of 1.65% (Castellucci, 2017). Of
the 3,500 hospitals, roughly a third received an overall decline from the program
(Castellucci, 2017).
These two programs have the potential to affect hospital financial performance.
Hospital financial performance relates to a hospital’s ability to generate enough income
from services and other sources to cover its costs. Any revenue that is not used to
cover its costs is profit. This level of financial performance is measured through financial
ratios, such as financial margin. It is not measured by performance-related metrics such
as patient satisfaction or the number of hospital-acquired infections. Financial
performance can be low or high, with high-performance resulting in a strong net income
after operating expenses.

4

HRRP and VBP have the potential to impact hospital margins since their
penalties directly affect the amount of revenue a hospital needs to cover its costs.
Recent research shows that the operating margins of some hospitals were affected as
much as 4.24% under these programs (Chen et al., 2017). Other studies have shown
that large teaching hospitals, which served as a major safety net in their communities by
treating larger shares of Medicare or socioeconomically disadvantaged patients, faced
the highest HRRP and VBP penalty rates (Bazzoli, Thompson, & Waters, 2018;
Thompson, Waters, Kaplan, Cao, & Bazzoli, 2017). Higher penalties can have a
significant impact on these hospitals and their margins (Bazzoli et al., 2018). These
penalty rates can disproportionately affect AHCs due to their high reliance on Medicare
payments, a large Medicare population, and high costs.
A theoretical model will be employed to investigate the effects of these
regulations on AHCs. Theories are important in research since they can provide a
complex and comprehensive explanation of areas that can be difficult to understand,
such as how organizations operate (Bacharach, 1989; Reeves, Albert, Kuper, &
Hodges, 2008; Van De Ven, 1989). With a theoretical model, we can better understand
the specific areas that are influencing changes in hospital margins in response to HRRP
and VBP. Organizational theories explain the behavior of organizations and
organizational phenomena by reviewing areas such as bureaucratic infrastructures,
integration, and the process of decision making. By understanding these behaviors,
theories, can be used to explain why some organizations act in certain ways or perform
differently than other organizations. Contingency theory is a popular perspective within
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the canon of macro-level organization theory that directly addresses organizational
performance.
Contingency theory provides a framework where an organization’s performance
is determined by its adoption of an organizational structure that best fits with the
environment that influences its operations. It was developed and advanced in the 1960s
through works that include Burns and Stalker (1961), Woodward (1965), Thompson
(1967), and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). Contingencies can be the communities and
patients that hospitals serve, revenue sources, and pressures to service the
organizations’ missions, among other items. Based on these contingencies, an
organization needs to adapt as contingencies change.
Contingency theory can be applied to explain the difference in AHC versus nonAHC financial performance under the environmental changes created by HRRP and
VBP. The collective implementation of HRRP and VBP represents a change in the
contingency of revenue sources, specifically Medicare payments. This altered
contingency would affect hospitals’ financial performance, leading to the need for
organizational change. However, contingency theory would also suggest that, as a new
contingency factor, the impact of the collective implementation of HRRP and VBP would
vary from hospital to hospital based on their environment and existing organizational
structure. Changes in contingencies would explain why AHCs would have their financial
performance affected to a different degree compared to non-AHCs. Additionally, AHCs
would have a more difficult time adapting to changes in HRRP or VBP than non-AHCs
due to their high reliance on government payers and large, cumbersome structures, that
make organizational changes more difficult.
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In this study, AHC status along with HRPR and VBP penalties will be the
independent variables with total and operating margin the dependent variables. The
study’s research questions seek to identify the effect of these programs on AHCs to
inform policymakers and AHC leadership.
Research Questions
Research Question 1
Are historical total and operating margins of AHCs statistically different from non-AHCs?
Research to date has not compared the operating and/or total margins of AHCs
to non-AHCs, even though it is to be expected that their financial margins would be
different, as noted above. This study will investigate the difference between AHCs’ and
non-AHCs’ operating and total margins through two periods of interest, pre-HRRP and
VBP (period 1 from 2011 to 2012) and post-HRRP and VBP (period 2 from 2013 to
2015). A descriptive analysis will be performed as a first step to understand if there is a
difference between these two hospital groups on the basis of total and operating margin
without introducing any other independent or control variables.
The descriptive analysis will be performed with period 1 and period 2 and
AHC/non-AHC group membership as the independent variables. AHC status will be
determined based on the Counsel of Teaching Hospital designation from the American
Association of Medical Colleges, and margins will be calculated from the CMS Medicare
Cost Reports. If there is a significant interaction between both, it will mean that both the
period and hospital group are associated with hospital financial margins and will be
informative in leading to the second research question.
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Research Question 2
Is the operating and total margins of AHCs more significantly negatively affected from
2011 to 2015, with the implementation of HRRP and VBP, compared to non-AHCs?
The study’s second research question investigates the impact of the HRRP and
VBP program on AHCs’ and non-AHCs’ operating and total margins over time while
controlling for several variables. The process will create a linear model that will analyze
the operating and total margins from 2011 through 2015. An independent variable of the
year will help guide the changes taking place in the contingencies for AHC and
HRRP/VBP. In addition to these variables and in line with other research, several
variables will be controlled for that have been historically shown as being linked with
hospital profitability (Bai & Anderson, 2016). The research question will control for state
Medicaid expansion, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on competitiveness, ownership status,
and health system affiliation. By controlling for these variables, the study will be able to
better assess the potential impact that HRRP and VBP have had on hospital profitability
(Bai & Anderson, 2016; Chen et al., 2017).
The expected outcome from the study is that AHCs will have experienced a
higher financial impact on operating and total margins from 2011 to 2015 than nonAHCs. As HRRP and VBP are implemented, it is expected that the operating and total
margins of both types of hospitals will fall. The fall in margins are due to the increasing
nature of the HRRP penalties from 1% to 3% and the implementation of VBP.
Scope and Analytic Approach of the Study
All the data in this study will be from publically available data sets including the
CMS Medicare Cost Reports, American Hospital Association Annual Survey, state
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websites on Medicare expansion, and data from the Association of American Medical
Colleges. Once the data is organized, SPSS will be used to review for outliers and
issues of multicollinearity. The first step in data analysis is to review the data for a
statistical difference in margins between AHCs and non-AHCs both pre and post-HRRP
and VBP. This will be informative as it will show if there is a significant difference when
including all factors that can after the different hospital types. The statistical analysis for
the first step is a repeated measures two-way ANOVA. A repeated measures analysis
of variance (RMANOVA) model will be used with the dependent variable being hospital
operating and total margin. The RMANOVA model will be a two-way model including
the interaction between the two factors. The between units factor is Hospital Type
(AHC or non-AHC), and the within unit factor is Period (Period 1 is years 2011-2012
(Pre- HRRP and VBP), Period 2 is years 2013-2015 (HRRP and VBP implemented)).
After this informative analysis, there will be a clear calculation of the differences
between AHCs’ and non-AHCs’ financial performance in the two periods.
After the data analysis, a RMANCOVA model will be used to analyze the
research question with the dependent variable being hospital operating and total margin
and independent variables of hospital type and HRRP/VBP penalty rates. The
RMANCOVA models combine both ANOVA and regression in the predictive model.
The RMANCOVA model will include a between units factor (Hospital type: AHC or nonAHC) and a within units factor (Year: 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 along with
combination of HRRP penalties and VBP incentives), as well as the interaction between
hospital type, HRRP and VBP penalty, and year. A strength of this analysis is that it will
be performed for both AHCs and non-AHCs, allowing for a complete model. It is
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expected that this analysis will show differential change in both operating and total
margin over time due to the inability of AHCs to respond and manage HRRP and VBP
as easily as non-AHCs.
Significance and Limitations of the Study
The purpose of the research is to demonstrate the difference in AHCs compared
to non-AHCs in the area of operating and total margin and to show the impact of HRRP
and VBP over the six years before and after its implementation. The research is novel in
its approach by providing valuable insight not only in the difference in the financial
performance between these two groups of organizations but also on the outlook of
AHCs’ financial health due to the implementation of the HRRP and VBP programs.
However, as with all research, this field of study faces several limitations.
The first limitation is the need to control for as many variables that impact
hospital profitability as possible. For instance, other policies and rules occurred other
than HRRP and VBP, such as the expansion of Medicaid. Multiple co-variates will be
used to control for as many variables associated with profitability as possible.
Second, there have been some concerns with the data reporting and the
accuracy that is provided by the hospitals in the Medicare cost reports. The main
concern is in the way hospitals report the data. There is not a stringent verification
process, which can lead to data outliers (Guadagnino, 2012). Data will need to be
reviewed for outliers to ensure its consistency. Future studies can build on the research
by including other government programs that affect profitability such as Hospital
Acquired Conditions penalties.

10

The innovation of the study is its focus on AHCs. The study will be the first to
review the difference in financial margins between AHCs and non-AHCs. Although the
nature of AHCs indicates higher costs, and their dependence on low paying government
programs would indicate lower revenue, little research has investigated if there is an
actual difference. In the second step, the study will be breaking new ground through its
investigation in the change in the financial margins of AHCs pre and post-HRRP and
VBP compared to non-AHCs. Previous research has not used five years of financial
information to create a model of the trends in financial health of AHCs. These two
unique focus areas need to be investigated now to understand how HRRP and VBP
have affected these hospitals’ financial health. The novel investigation into the financial
performance of AHCs will shed light on how they fared under these government
programs. By maintaining their financial positions, these hospitals will continue not only
to serve their populations but also continue to advance science and educate the next
generation of healthcare providers.
Organization of Subsequent Chapters
The remaining chapters will provide more detail on the history of academic health
centers and government policies, a detailed review of the literature to date that is
pertinent to this study, the theoretical framework, the methods used in this study, the
study’s results, and its conclusion. Chapter 2 reviews the background of AHCs, the
Hospital Readmission Reduction Program, and Value Based Purchasing. It also reviews
the relevant literature on the financial performance of hospitals related to government
programs and how information is pertinent to the study of AHC profitability. Chapter 3
outlines the theoretical framework for the study, contingency theory. It reviews the
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history and constructs of the theory and how they shape the study’s vision and
hypotheses. Chapter 4 forms the study’s design including the methods used, data
sources and transformations, statistical procedures, and variables. The results of the
methods and procedures are represented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses how the
results of the analysis are related and support or refute study hypotheses. It also
reviews how the theoretical framework was supported or refuted by the results. Finally,
the potential implications of the study will be reviewed.

12

Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter reviews the literature on Academic Health Centers (AHCs), HRRP
and VBP. The chapter begins with an in-depth discussion of AHCs and their unique role
in the US health care system. It reviews why they are important to the health care
system and how their financial performance may be especially susceptible to changes
in payer processes. It then discusses HRRP and VBP programs, their inception, and
how the programs have impacted hospitals nationwide, along with a review of the
current literature on the impact of HRRP and VBP on hospitals. This chapter will close
by synthesizing the current literature and identifying gaps in the research.
Academic Health Centers
Overview. AHCs are unique health care providers with a mission of advancing
science, educating health care providers, and providing complex care to disadvantaged
populations (Tallia & Howard, 2012). Even though AHCs do not have a specific
definition, they are typically comprised of a medical school plus additional health
professions’ schools, such as nursing or dental; have extensive biomedical research
programs; and have one or more affiliated hospitals or health systems (Robertson,
2013). These hospitals are often in urban environments and act as safety net hospitals,
hospitals that serve a substantial level of low income or vulnerable populations. Due to
their size, various services, and typical central locations, they are often on the front line
for public health and natural disasters (AAHC, 2018). These mission driven activities
require additional funding to remain operational. Much of the funding for these activities
comes from reimbursement for care: insurance payments.
Generally, teaching hospitals engage in primary or secondary medical education
and employ residents for training purposes. The American Hospital Association
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recognizes over 1,000 teaching hospitals in the United States. A subset of these
hospitals are AHCs (AHA, 2018). AHCs hospitals are defined and recognized as being
part of the Council of Teaching Hospitals, or COTH, a member organization under the
Association of American Medical Colleges. COTH is an organization that represents the
nation’s leading teaching hospitals and health systems (AAMC, 2018a).
There are various membership levels under the COTH designation. To be a
COTH member, a hospital needs to have an affiliation agreement with a medical school
accredited by the liaison Committee on Medical Education. Each hospital also must
participate in at least four residency programs with at least two being in medicine,
surgery, obstetrics/gynecology, pediatrics, family practice, or psychiatry (AAMC, 2018b).
The COTH designation includes health systems, individual hospitals, and Veterans
Affairs hospitals. For this study, only COTH members that are eligible for HRRP and
VBP are considered. The COTH members that are excluded are children, cancer, and
Veterans Affairs hospitals. As of February 2018 there were 221 COTH members that
will be included.
Tri-part mission. The AHC tri-part mission is critical to the success of the U.S.
health care system but is expensive to fund. This is due, in part, to the intensive work it
takes to educate the next generation of physicians through Graduate Medical Education
(GME). GME trains physicians after graduation from medical school in their chosen area
of medial specialization. This training can last three to seven years after medical school
graduation and occurs at teaching hospitals and in their ambulatory care settings
(MEDPAC, 2007). Reuter (1997) found AHCs are 80% costlier than non-teaching
community hospitals largely due to educational costs. For example, AHCs average
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$2,681 of cost per case in 1993 while all other large non-teaching hospitals had an
average cost of $676 per case in 1993 (Reuter, 1997). A 2002 study estimated the
average AHC cost per case was 80% higher than the national average. This cost
difference between an AHC and non-AHC may contribute to a difference in profit
margins across these two hospital types. Additionally, the base operating DRG
payments from Medicare are similar between AHCs and non-AHCs operating in the
same geographic area, although AHCs qualify for some additional Medicare revenue
supplements not provided to non-AHCs.
Some of the additional treatment costs for Medicare patients experienced at
AHCs are covered through Direct Graduate Medical Education (DGME) and Indirect
Medical Education (IME) payments from Medicare. These supplemental payments are
in recognition that teaching hospitals will have higher costs of care when compared to
non-teaching hospitals due to their educational activities. These programs were started
in 1965 as part of the Hospital Insurance Program Act. The Act recognized that
government insurance should compensate hospitals for the costs of trainees including
stipends as well as compensation for educators. A 2018 report by AAMC found that
COTH teaching hospitals spent an average of $165,556 in 2015 to train a resident
(AAMC, 2018c). Medicare’s share of the costs is was only $43,370 in 2015 for DGME
(AAMC, 2018c). The remaining balance must be covered by a hospital’s revenue
recoveries.
One study found that out of an estimated $27 billion in total AHC mission-related
costs in 2002, $16.2 billion was related to GME (Koenig et al., 2003). A 2013 study
found the costs of stipends, faculty supervision, simulation and other equipment, and

15

salaries for administrative staff were estimated to account for $16 billion annually
(Grover et al., 2014). Out of the total cost of GME, only $3.4 billion was covered for
DGME and $8.3 billion for IME in 2016 by Medicare (RGC, 2017). In addition to the
increase in direct costs, recent unfunded mandates, such as decreased duty hours and
stricter supervision requirements, have increased the cost for residency training
programs (Grover et al., 2014).
In addition to issues related to their patient populations, AHCs are often
responsible for providing complex care. The ability to provide complex and expensive
services requires equipment and medical teams that are not fully utilized. The expenses
for this underutilized capacity cover equipment such as positron emission tomography
(PET) scanners, specialty care beds, and other expensive services such as transplant
units (Koenig et al., 2003). In 2002, a study by Koenig et al. (2003) estimated these
services cost AHCs $9.6 billion in 2002. Additionally, they found nearly 80% of regional
standby services, such as level 1 trauma centers, are AHCs.
AAMC reported that in fiscal year 2016 61% of all pediatric intensive care beds
were in COTH hospitals and 69% of all burn unit beds were in COTH hospitals (AAMC,
2018c). COTH hospitals also represent 96% of all comprehensive cancer centers, and
25% of all Medicaid hospitalizations in 2016 (AAMC, 2018c). COTH hospitals support
25% of all charitable care costing a median of $15.3 million per year compared to $0.6
million for nonteaching hospitals in 2016 (AAMC, 2018c). AHCs often serve large
numbers of indigent, Medicare, and Medicaid patients (Thier, 2001). These services
have been historically expensive to operate and maintain, further straining AHCs
available funding.
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Research is another key part of AHC’s mission. The research performed not only
advances human health, but also fuels the economy and spurs research innovation.
Much of the funding for research comes from the National Institutes of Health. In 2013,
the NIH funded almost to $13 billion for research in medical schools and teaching
hospitals toward the direct cost of providing research. Although the NIH does provide
funds for facilities and administration cost, these funds do not cover the full cost of
supporting research. In a survey by the AAMC in 2013, it was estimated that the
average medical school investment was an additional $.53 for every dollar of sponsored
research it received. This investment generated $13.7 to $398 million per year in
additional costs not funded by the granting agencies, with the average per hospital
being around $111 million (Datahound, 2015). This estimate was based on reporting by
forty-six institutions whose research ranged from $26 to $751 million per year. Much of
the unfunded costs are supported by clinical revenues and other revenue sources,
which puts additional financial strain on AHCs. (Datahound, 2015)
As noted above, it was estimated that all mission related costs combined in 2002
totaled $27 billion (Koenig et al., 2003). The combination of high reliance on low paying
populations, the need to provide expensive care, and the educational and research
missions of AHCs, makes their reliance on government sources of revenue and pay-forperformance programs all the more important.
Hospital Readmission Reduction Program
In the 2000s, a high level of hospital readmission rates began to gain national
attention. Thomas, Rahman, Mor, and Intrator (2014) reported that in 2007
approximately 20% of Medicare patients age 65 years and older had been readmitted to
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a hospital within 30 days of discharge. Toles et al (2014), reviewed readmission rates in
North and South Carolina in 2007 and found that within 90 days of release from a
hospital, 37.5% of Medicare beneficiaries treated at skilled nursing facilities were
readmitted to a hospital within 30 days. These readmissions are costly for Medicare and
the health care system. A 2007 Medicare Payment Advisory Commission report
estimated that Medicare was spending $12 billion on potentially preventable
readmissions in 2005 (MEDPAC, 2007).
Some of these high rates are related to the reimbursement policy of Medicare.
Until 2012, the payment policy of Medicare covered services based on care provided,
and not on the quality of that care. If the care given resulted in infections or other issues
requiring readmission of patients, or additional procedures, the hospitals did not
experience any negative financial repercussions. With the growing trend and cost of
readmissions, Medicare started focusing on reducing readmission rates and improving
the quality of care and follow-up that patients receive (Wachino, Artiga, & Rudowitz,
2014).
In October 2012, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
attempted to address this growing trend by implementing the Hospital Readmissions
Reduction Program (CMS D, 2018). This program intended to penalize hospitals with
risk-standardized readmission rates higher than the national averages for certain types
of patient diagnoses and procedures. These penalties are calculated based on risk
adjusted measures of unplanned readmissions, a patient returning to a hospital within
30 days of discharge for any reason to an acute care hospital. A 30 day window is used
because readmissions and deaths after a longer period of time may have less to do with
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the care provided in the hospital and more to do with the other complicating illnesses,
patient’s own behavior, or care provided to patients after hospital discharge. These
rates are calculated for Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 and older who were enrolled in
Medicare for 12 months before their hospital admission. Additionally, the rates do not
include patients who died during the initial admission, who left the hospital against
medical advice, or have documented co-morbidities that would cause a readmission to
be expected (Medicare.gov, 2018).
At its inception, the program focused on three main diagnoses: acute myocardial
infarction (AMI), congestive heart failure, and pneumonia (McIlvennan, Eapen, & Allen,
2015). Each year, CMS calculates risk-standardized readmission rates for each
hospital, compares them with national averages for the same condition, and then
determines the penalty. This program was gradually implemented over three years.
Penalties are assessed on all Medicare payments for each hospital, regardless of the
type of diagnosis or procedure for which the Medicare patient receives treatment. The
penalties started at 1% of all Medicare payments for that hospital in 2013, then
increased to 2% in year two, and 3% in year three (Boccuti & Casillas, 2017). This
scaffold process of implementing the program was intended to give hospitals the
opportunity to improve their readmission rates prior to the full penalty being imposed.
The penalties have had a sizeable impact, costing hospitals $290 million in 2012
and $528 million in 2017 (Boccuti & Casillas, 2017). Since the program’s
implementation, Medicare has imposed $1.89 billion in penalties (Boccuti & Casillas,
2017). The HRRP program appears to have had some desirable effects, with patients
experiencing decreased readmissions since HRRP implementation. In 2012, CMS
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reported that its All-Cause Hospital Readmission measure, which is a risk-standardized
readmission rate for all beneficiaries age 65 or older, fell from 19% to 17.8% over a 5year period (Ness & Kramer, 2013). Although this is only a 1% change, this was a shift
from the trend of increasing readmission rates years prior to 2012.
One study found the reduction in readmissions was achieved not only by
hospitals who had readmission rates close to the national average, but also by hospitals
with readmission rates well above the national average (Wasfy et al., 2017). With these
results, CMS expanded its initial focus to include COPD, hip/knee replacement, and, in
2016, coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CMS D, 2018). Overall, penalties have
increased over the last five years, both in terms of the number of facilities penalized and
the size of the penalty (Rice, 2015). In 2016, only 799 hospitals of the 3,400 hospitals
included nationally were not assessed penalties under the program (Rice, 2015). This
large percentage of hospitals that were penalized, 76.5%, leads many hospitals to
argue against the sweeping nature of these penalties and their actual benefit.
The question of the effectiveness and appropriateness of these penalties has
driven much of the research done to date. In a study by Gu et al. (2014), researchers
reviewed the impact of HRRP on hospitals serving vulnerable populations. The research
compared profit margin between hospital types to understand the HRRPs financial
impact. The study used regression analysis to estimate the risk-adjusted readmission
rates and financial penalties under HRRP. The researchers found that hospitals with
higher proportions of patients that were dual-eligible had higher hospital readmission
rates and lower operating margins. Gu and the research team concluded HRRP
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penalties assessed on hospitals that have low profit margins could affect their ability to
continue care for their vulnerable populations.
In a similar study, Joynt and Jha (2013) used data from 2008 through 2011
applying HRRP criteria to historical data to review what the impact of HRRP would have
been had HRRP was implemented in previous years. They found major teaching
hospitals were more likely to be penalized than non-teaching hospitals; 44% vs 33%.
The researchers recognized that although the penalties may be small, they could have
a large effect on hospitals that had low profit margins.
Another question researchers have attempted to address is if safety net hospitals
are penalized at a higher rate than other hospitals and if they were able to reduce their
penalty rates. In an article by Carey and Lin (2016), the authors studied changes in
HRRP penalties from 2013 to 2015 for safety net hospitals compared to other hospitals.
They found safety net hospitals had higher readmission rates to begin with and had
more room for improvement. The researchers compared two groups of hospitals that
both started with the same percentage of 30 day readmissions in 2013 to see if those
groups rates were significantly different 3 years after the implementation of HRRP in
2015. One group was comprised of safety nets and another of hospitals categorized as
‘other’ non safety net hospitals. The researchers focused on the actual number of
readmissions within that 30 day period and not the actual HRRP penalty rate. The
researchers found that while both groups the number of readmissions, safety net
hospitals did not show as large an improvement. Using myocardial infarctions as a
marker, safety-net hospitals improved only 2.86% whereas other hospitals improved
3.20%. This difference demonstrates the difficulty safety net hospitals may have in
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reducing their rates compared to other hospitals. The researchers also recognized the
cost to reduce readmission rates. They noted these costs involve items such as staff
time and new technologies to track and manage readmission rates and that these
investments may create burden for hospitals with limited budgets and tight financial
margins. These investments also could result in further declines on their financial
margins and could be made at the expense of other mission-related activities.
Research by DuGoff, Bishop and Rawal (2014) supported this finding, noting that
HRRP penalties can exacerbate the financial challenges that safety net hospitals
already encounter and could lead to hospital closures in underserved areas. Even with
the HRRP program’s risk adjustment formula, patient factors related to their
socioeconomic status are not included. Since such factors are not considered, there is
concern that these penalties will adversely affect the ability of hospitals serve vulnerable
hospital populations. In fiscal year 2019, CMS intends to incorporate socioeconomic
status adjustments into the calculation of HRRP penalties, but it is still unclear how
these adjustments will be implemented.
In March 2017, the Kaiser Foundation performed a review of the first five years of
HRRP implementation (Boccuti & Casillas, 2017). They found that, across all five years
of the program, major teaching hospitals, hospitals with higher shares of low-income
beneficiaries, and safety net hospitals were among the highest penalized. These three
groups of hospitals were penalized 86% of the time compared to other hospitals at 66%.
This combination of penalized group’s compound with AHCs as AHCs typically fall in
each of these three groupings. These findings were corroborated in a study by
Thompson et al. (Thompson et al., 2017).
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Thompson et al. (2017) found that hospitals, penalized in the early years of
HRRP, were more likely to be penalized in subsequent years. Moreover, they
determined that four specific categories of hospitals (urban, major teaching, large,
and/or safety-net hospitals) were more likely to be penalized in all years. These four
demographics often encompass AHCs based on AAMC data (AAMC, 2018c). They also
found that hospitals treating higher proportions of socioeconomically disadvantaged
patients maintained a substantial penalty burden over their study period. These higher
proportional shares of penalties may financially stress these specific hospitals more
than other types of hospitals.
Thompson et al. (2017) also made the connection between the financial penalties
and the burden on hospitals with high dependence on Medicare revenue. In their
analysis, higher proportions of Medicare patients were associated with greater risk for
larger penalties, due to a higher proportion of hospital overall reimbursements being tied
to Medicare.
The HRRP program was designed and has been implemented with a standard
formula that is applied to all hospitals equally. A standard approach to all hospitals can
have unintended consequences as not all hospitals characteristics are incorporated in
the formula to ensure an equitable outcome. Research has found that large teaching,
safety net hospitals with large Medicare patient populations are among the most likely to
be penalized, an outcome of the HRRP formula. Although the penalty rates may not be
large percentagewise, these rates can have a substantial impact on these hospitals.
Research to date has focused on the penalty rates with little research being done on the
impact of penalties on financial margins over time and the specific difference between
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AHCs and non-AHCs. To better understand the impact of these rates on AHCs, this
study will build on the existing research by assessing differences in financial measures
across AHCs and non-AHCs.
Value Based Purchasing
Value Based Purchasing (VBP) is another program implemented through the
Affordable Care Act and a response by CMS to change the focus from a quantity
payment system to one more focused on quality. VBP was established to encourage
hospitals to provide higher quality of care in a more efficient way. It was instituted on
July 1, 2011 for discharges of Medicare patients occurring on or after October 1, 2011,
federal fiscal year 2012, for Medicare subsection (d) hospitals. A Medicare subsection
(d) hospital is a general, acute care, short-term hospital. Unlike HRRP, this program
was designed to incentivize and reward hospitals that met or exceeded the performance
standards established. This was an advancement by CMS as they state that this
program is intended to “…transform Medicare from a passive payer of claims to an
active purchaser of quality health care for its beneficiaries” (CMS E, 2013). To fund this
program, all applicable hospitals have their MS-DRG payments reduced by 2%. These
funds create a pool that are redistributed to those hospitals meeting performance
objectives on the program dimensions described below.
An important component of this program was establishing a set of agreed upon
quality measures through partnerships with stakeholders. CMS identified three areas
that would guide the scoring methodology including; a) providers should be scored on
their overall achievement relative to national benchmarks; b) scoring methodologies
should be weighted more heavily towards outcome, patient experience, and functional
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status measures; and c) methodologies should be reliable and as straightforward as
possible.
With these guiding principles, CMS established 45 measures under the Hospital
IQR program that focus on quality of care provided to Medicare patients, how closely
best clinical practices are followed, and how well hospitals enhance patients
experiences (CMS F, 2017). These measures are broken down into four weighted
domains: safety, clinical care, efficiency and cost reduction, and patent and caregivercentered experience of care/care coordination. Each domain is weighted at 25%. To
ensure the measures remained relevant CMS made provisions to change or replace
quality measures or indicators when they were no longer relevant, were shown to not
represent the best clinical practice, and/or were no longer appropriate. (CMS F, 2017).
The VBP program works by providing incentive payments to hospitals based on
one of two criteria: 1) how well hospitals perform on each measure compared to the
performance of other hospitals during a baseline period (achievement); and 2) how
much hospitals improve their performance on each measure compared to their
performance in a baseline period (improvement) (CMS F, 2017). CMS calculates both
sets of criteria to determine bonuses and uses whichever criteria results in a higher
bonus.
Casterllucci (2017) found about 57% of hospitals will receive Medicare bonuses
in 2018. This represents roughly 1,600 hospitals in the US, which is an increase from
2017 when about 55% of hospitals received a bonus. On the other hand, the number of
hospitals for which bonuses did not exceed payment reductions to create the VBP pool
fell from 1,343 in 2017 to 1,211 in 2018. The total number of hospitals that are
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participating in the program also fell from 2,955 in 2017 to 2,808 in 2018. This study
also found more than half of the hospitals in the program will see only a small change (0.5 to 0.5) to their DRG payments due to this program in 2018 from their 2017 figures.
The highest performing hospitals saw an increase in their DRG payments of 3%
whereas the lowest performing hospitals saw a cut of 1.65%.
Gilman, et al., (2015) reviewed the effect of VBP on safety net hospitals. They
found that the VBP program more heavily penalized these hospitals compared to nonsafety net hospitals. In 2014, 63% of safety net hospitals received payment reductions
whereas only 51% of non-safety net other hospitals received reductions. A primary
reason noted by the researchers for this poor performance related to process-of-care
and patient experience scores. Safety net hospitals tend to fare worse on these scores
compared to other hospitals. Curtis and Bernheim (2013) commented that teaching
hospitals serving underserved populations may experience a potential loss of revenue
that would “unduly strain” their financial health.
HRRP and VBP Research
Existing research has investigated the combined effect of HRRP and VBP on
hospitals. These two areas are important to review together as the benefit of VBP could
counteract the penalties from HRRP or the 2% reduction could layer on an additional
penalty to hospitals that are performing poorly under both programs.
Figueroa, Wang, and Jha (2016) reviewed the characteristics of hospitals
receiving the largest pay for performance penalties, including HRRP, VBP, and Hospital
Acquired Infections Reduction Program (HACRP), a similar program to HRRP and VBP
that was implemented in fiscal year 2015. The study found hospitals classified as large

26

were 12.1% more likely to be penalized and major teaching hospitals were 10.6% more
likely to be penalized. The study also found safety net hospitals were 15.9% more likely
to be penalized. The researchers summarized their findings by stating that hospitals that
fall in the three categories of large, major teaching, safety nets hospitals were
significantly more likely to be penalized under all three programs. These categories are
in line with AHCs, which are often large major teaching hospitals that serve as safety
nets.
Chen et al. (2017) specifically looked into disadvantaged hospitals (as they are
more susceptible to financial penalties based on previous research into safety-net
hospitals) and the effect of HRRP and VBP, on hospital total and operating margins.
The study focused on comparing Mississippi Delta region hospitals to other national
hospitals outside of this region. The Mississippi Delta region was selected as it has
been identified by the Census Bureau as socioeconomically disadvantaged with a
mostly rural population consisting of minority and underserved individuals with high
rates of diseases. The researchers found that although the total margin, measured as
net total revenue minus costs divided by total revenue, between Mississippi Delta
Region hospitals and hospitals outside of this region were different pre-HRRP and VBP,
and that the gap between their financial margins widened between 2008 and 2014.
Also, between 2008 and 2011, the unadjusted total margin gap ranged between 1.55%
and 2.55% between Mississippi Delta region hospitals and other hospitals, varying
slightly in each year. In 2012, the gap between financial margin remained at 1.71% but
saw a steep separation in 2013 of 4.18% and an even larger gap of 5.04% in 2014
between the two groups of hospitals.
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A similar, but more dramatic, difference was found with unadjusted operating
margin, measured as patient revenue minus cost divided by patient revenue. The
average difference between the two hospital groups was 2.59% from 2008 to 2011 but
increased to 6.11% in 2012, 7.94% in 2013, and 8.92% in 2014. The researchers
concluded that these differences between the hospital groups was likely due to the
amount of penalties incurred from HRRP and VBP, along with the increased
expenditures for infrastructure investments to reduce readmission and improve quality.
Similarly, Gilman et al., (2015) researchers assessed the combined impact that
VBP and HRRP had on safety net hospitals. The authors examined uncompensated
care costs per bed as their safety net indicator. The financial effect on hospitals was
assessed by examining the probability of incurring a penalty and the magnitude of that
penalty. The study found safety net hospitals were less likely to receive VBP bonuses
(37% compared to 49%) of non-safety net hospitals, and were more likely to be
penalized (63% compared to 51%). This is in line with another study by Gilman, et al.,
(2015). When HRRP was examined, it was found that safety net hospitals were more
likely to have higher readmission rations for acute myocardial infarction, heart failure,
and pneumonia compared to other hospitals. As a result of this, safety net hospitals saw
greater penalties compared to other hospitals. When assessing the combined effect of
these penalties, safety net hospitals had penalties almost twice that of other hospitals.
Gilman et al. (2015) also found that 1 of every 10 safety net hospitals received a
payment reduction of 1.0% or greater in 2014. The researchers noted that although this
is a small percentage, these hospitals have tight margins and high rates of Medicare
patients, which could more substantially affect them financially. Moreover, high penalty
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rates year after year could have a lasting effect on these hospitals and the communities
they serve.
Bazzoli, Thompson, and Waters (2018) also examined the combined effect of
HRRP and VBP on hospitals, with special emphasis on its effect on safety net hospitals.
The study focused on the financial condition, both operating and total margins, of
hospitals under these programs in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. They found safety net
hospitals did have higher average penalty rates relative to the other hospital types.
Additionally, researchers found that predicted operating margins did decline significantly
for all hospital types with higher penalty rates. However, total margins for safety net
hospitals were not significantly affected by penalty rate increases, although such
increases resulted in significant total margin declines for non-safety net hospitals. One
reason that total margin declines did not occur for safety net hospitals as their penalties
increased is that total margin includes other revenue sources, such as charitable
contributions and public appropriations, which are likely greater for safety net hospitals
relative to non-safety net hospitals. Thus, safety net hospitals may be filling financial
gaps they may be experiencing in operating margins as penalty rates increase. As the
researchers recognized, safety net hospitals may be using other sources or diverting
budgets from other programs to fill in the financial gap that HRRP and VBP has created.
The rebalancing of funds may have created a short-term solution but may not be a longterm solution to funding gaps these programs are creating. This study will expand on
this research using fiscal periods prior to HRRP and VBP and expand the fiscal years
reviewed to 2015.
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Kahn et al. (2015) assessed the combined average payment adjustments of
HRRP, VBP, and HACRP. Although the study found that, the three programs resulted in
only a -0.5% reduction of total operating payments for the 3,400 hospitals studied, the
reduction was -0.9% for major teaching hospitals. With major teaching hospitals
penalized at a rate nearly double that of non-teaching hospitals, these hospitals could
be worse off financially. Additionally, when taking into consideration the possibility that
these larger hospitals are more dependent on Medicare as a payer, the financial impact
could be substantial. The researchers also found in 2015, major teaching hospitals were
1.60, 2.58, and 4.04 times more likely to be penalized for VBP, HRRP and Hospital
Acquired Infections Reduction Program, respectively, when compared to non-teaching
hospitals. The researchers concluded the disproportionate effect on major teaching
hospitals is cause for further research into the impact of these programs on hospitals.
Most of the early research on HRRP assessed the impact that HRRP has had on
overall readmission rates, with some research focusing on the association of certain
hospital characteristics to levels of readmission rates. More recently, researchers have
examined the early relationship between HRRP and VBP penalties on hospital financial
performance, but these studies have been limited to only a few fiscal years of data and
did not compare hospital performance and margins before and after program
implementation. Finally, research has not yet included recent financial data and
assessed differential impacts on AHCs compared to non-AHCs.
Prior Research on Hospital Profitability
In addition to exploring the impact of HRRP and VBP on hospitals, several
studies have explored hospital financial performance and thus provide useful guidance
to this study regarding key control variables for a multivariate analysis. Bai and
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Anderson (Bai & Anderson, 2016) performed a detailed analysis of the various factors
that are associated with hospital profitability. Through the measurement of net income
from patient care services per adjusted discharge of acute care hospitals for fiscal year
2013, the researchers examined the following three main set of factors and
characteristics that were associated with profitability: a) ownership; b) market power;
and c) other characteristics.
Through a regression analysis, they found that geographical location was linked
to profitability. Hospitals in the Northeast had the highest median losses while the
hospitals in the West earned a profit. Mark-ups were also linked to profitability with
hospitals with mark-ups above the median being more likely to be profitable compared
to hospitals with low mark-ups. Hospitals that were part of large systems and with
regional power tended to earn high profits when compared to independent, low market
share hospitals. Small rural hospitals (less than 50 beds) were also found to be less
profitable.
In line with the research in this chapter, major teaching hospitals had larger
losses compared to urban, larger, non-teaching hospitals. Hospitals that had lower
proportion of Medicare patients also were more profitable. Hospitals that shorter lengths
of stay and lower costs per adjusted discharge showed higher profits as well.
Following prior research, for-profit hospitals were again found to be more
profitable while public hospitals were the least profitable. Some of the most prestigious
hospitals, such as Stanford Hospital and the University of Pennsylvania, were among
the most profitable, leading the researchers to conclude they were able to leverage
bargaining power with insurers. Bai and Anderson (2016) were able to build on an
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existing body of knowledge to further the comprehensive review on hospital
characteristics and their impact of profitability. This knowledge has been used by
researchers to control for potential confounders and thus isolate relationships between
key characteristics and hospital profitability.
This is seen in research such as Bazzoli et al. (2018) which used variables such
as teaching status, ownership status, system membership, among other variables as
control variables. Similarly Chen et al. (2017) used hospital characteristics such as
ownership teaching, percentage of Medicaid and Medicare patients, and case mix index
as covariates in their analysis of hospitals profitability is the Mississippi Delta region.
Finally, Horwitz (2005) used similar covariates of hospital and market characteristics,
size (measured by admissions), and geographic location when assessing profits in forprofit and not-for-profit hospitals. This study will continue this method through the use of
several covariates to isolate the impact of HRRP and VBP.
Literature Synthesis and Gap Addressed by this Study
AHC’s have been recognized as having substantial costs connected to their
unique mission and patient population. Research to date has shown that these costs
can be considerably higher for AHCs compared to non-AHCs. Research has also
shown that AHC patient populations are more heavily weighted toward low paying
government insurers. This limits revenues available to cover higher costs which could
lead to worse financial outcomes. AHCs also have access to government subsidies due
to their patient population and costs through DSH payments and GME education, which
to some degree may offset operating losses. Research suggests that the combination of
these factors may affect their financial outcomes and profitability but research has not
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directly focused on investigating AHCs financial performance using financial margin.
This study seeks to address this gap by focusing on AHCs and their financial
performance compared to non-AHCs.
AHCs dependencies can also lead AHCs to be more susceptible to changes in
government programs and policies. Such government programs are HRRP and VBP.
Much research has been done about HRRP and VBP, and studies have found that
teaching hospitals, not for profits, and those hospitals that are dependent on
government payers are more susceptible to penalties and reduced margins. However,
prior research has focused on national trends or on hospitals in certain regions, and has
not focused on AHCs as a distinct population. This study will address this gap through
an examination of the effects of HRRP and VBP on AHCs and non-AHC financial
margins.
When viewed as a whole, there is a clear gap in the research for the effect of
HRRP and VBP on AHCs financial performance. This study attempts to address this
gap by using contingency theory as a framework to explore AHCs organizational
financial performance around HRRP and VBP.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework
The conceptual framework for the study is contingency theory. Contingency
theory is used to examine the organizational fit and performance for AHC and nonAHCs pre and post HRRP and VBP. Contingency theory provides a framework which
can be used to understand and explain the varying levels of organizational performance
even for those hospitals operating in the same environment. This chapter starts with a
background on contingency theory, its constructs, and framework. Then, it discusses
the contingent relationships that affect hospital performance and the unique
contingencies for AHCs and non-AHCs. Next, a conceptual model is developed through
the linking of contingencies and financial performance of the two hospital groups.
Finally, the chapter discusses the hypotheses that are formed based on contingency
theory framework.
A Background of Contingency Theory
Contingency theory, also referred to as structural contingency theory, is a theory
that address organizational structure, design, and performance. It suggests that
organizational performance is related to the balance, or fit, between an organization’s
structure and the varied contingencies it faces. Contingency theory was developed and
advanced in the 1960s through works by Burns and Stalker in 1961, followed by
Woodward in 1965, Lawrence and Lorsch in 1967, and Thompson in 1967 (Hatch &
Cunliffe, 2006). Contingency theory has three main tenets: 1) there is no one best way
to organize for every situation; 2) different ways of organizing are not equally effective
for a given situation; and 3) for a given situation, the best way to organize depends on
the dominant environmental characteristic (Scott & Davis, 2007).
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In contingency theory’s earliest writings, potential contingencies were defined as
an organization’s size, task uncertainty, and task interdependence (Burns & Stalker,
1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). An organization’s size, or the
number of members to be organized with in an organziation, dictates the bureaucratic
structure of the organization. Donaldson (2001) defines a bureaucratic structure as the
level of delegation for decision making. Smaller organizations perform better with a
decentralized structure, whereas larger organizations perform better under a centralized
structure (Donaldson, 2001). Task uncertainty refers to the uncertainty that external
factors such as the environment and technology bring to the accomplishment of tasks
within organizations. Task uncertainty can lead to confusion for managers and leaders
in how tasks should be conducted inside the organization (Donaldson, 2001). The third
contingency is task interdependence, which is the way activities performed within an
organization are connected with one another. Task interdependence can be described
as pooled, sequential, or reciprocal, and contingency theorists suggest that the different
ways that activities are arranged and connected to one another are better suited by
different structures (Donaldson, 2001; Thompson, 1967).
These three contingencies were later expanded into four organizational
contingencies: organizational size, strategy, technology, and environment (Chandler,
1962; Scott & Davis, 2007). Under the expanded contingencies, organization size
remained linked to simple and complex structures. Strategy is linked to structures and
organizational management. Some organizations group departments by function (i.e.,
Human Resources or Finance) or by product line. Technology is not used in the modern
sense as a reference to computers and programs, but rather represents the
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communication and work that is performed within an organization. An environment that
has multiple products is better suited to have a structure that is organized by those
product lines (Chandler, 1962; Scott & Davis, 2007).
Contingency theory later evolved to include contingencies as any variables that
moderate the effect of an organizational characteristic on organizational performance
(Pugh & Hickson, 2007). Contingencies are now considered to be a wide range of
environmental and market variables and influences. In the application of contingency
theory in research, the key variable(s) of interest are defined as contingencies.
Researchers may use other control variables in answering research questions such as
geographic locations, regulation, organization mission and pressures, and customer mix
in addition to primary contingency variables (Pugh & Hickson, 2007). Contingencies
range from factors that can be internal or external to the organization. Internal
contingencies can be areas such as task uncertainty, internal interdependence, or
organizational size. External contingencies can be the environment in which the
organization operates, or the influences on customers and environmental policies
(Donaldson, 2001). The external contingencies influence internal contingencies, thus
influencing organizational structures.
Contingency Theory and Performance
Contingency theorists posit that the better fit between an organization’s structure
and its contingencies, the higher performance that organization will obtain (Donaldson,
2001; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Scott & Davis, 2007). If an organization has a poor fit
with its contingencies, then that organization will have poor performance. As
contingencies change, an organization’s previous structural fit with previous
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contingencies could turn to a misfit, which would lead to poorer performance unless the
organizational structure changes. The link between misfit with poor performance and fit
with high performance is what motivates organizations to have the most optimal fit they
can obtain (Donaldson, 2001; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Scott & Davis, 2007).
An important addition to contingency theory is the concept of Structural
Adaptation to Regain Fit (SARFIT), as described by Donaldson (2001). SARFIT
recognizes that as contingencies shift and change, organizations will adapt their
structure to meet the new and changing demands of the contingencies. SARFIT is a
disequilibrium theory, as it recognizes that as performance changes, it affects the
equilibrium point, causing ‘misfit,’ at which time the organizational structure will change
to meet the new demands. Fit and misfit cause the organization to go through constant
phases of stasis and change to achieve maximum performance (Donaldson, 2006).
In summary, SARFIT and, more broadly, contingency theory focus on the
contingencies of the organization, the organizational structure, the fit to the environment
in which the company is competing, and the high or low performance of those
organizations. In Figure 1, these relationships are shown. The contingencies on the top
left along with the organizational structure on the top right feed into the organization’s fit
in the market. If fit leads to high performance, then the organization's structure will
remain static, as shown on the bottom left. If the organizational fit leads to low
performance, then the organization will need to change to obtain a better fit, bottom
right. The fit and misfit approach, and its effect on an organization’s structure and
performance, helps to explain why AHCs and non-AHCs perform differently in the
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environment and how the changes in contingencies, such as the change in regulations,
can affect that fit and the performance of organizations.

Contingencies

Tasks
Regulation

Strategies
Organizational
Structure
Market
Fit
Low
Performance

High
Performance

Structual Change
Needed

Static
Structure
Figure 1. Visualization of contingency theory.
The Health Care Industry and Fit

In the United States, there are many types of structures that health care
organizations employ. For example, among hospitals, structures vary from large, forprofit health systems with multiple hospital facilities in large cities, to small, independent,
community-based not-for-profit hospitals located in rural areas (Fleming, 1981). Per
contingency theory, hospitals adopt structures based on their environmental
contingencies, which are then modified over the years to maximize hospitals’
performance with changes in their contingencies. Several studies have looked at the
relationship between fit and performance for health care organizations.
For example, Wang and colleagues (2001) used contingency theory as a
conceptual framework to examine the association of managed care with hospital vertical
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integration and the relationship between that integration and the hospital’s efficiency
and financial performance. The researchers used the contingency-based strategic
adaptation model to select factors that have important influence on strategic choice with
performance implications. Contingent factors of environment were used as variables to
represent managed care concentration while level of forward and backward integration
was used as the variables to represent profitability and productivity. In addition to these
contingent variables, the researchers incorporated several control variables including
market and hospital characteristics. With contingency theory as a framework, the
researchers found strong support for the association between managed care and
vertical integration. Backward integration was correlated with higher profitability while
forward integration was not; however, forward integration was associated with higher
rates of productivity.
Trinh and O’Connor (2002) used contingency theory as a theoretical framework
to understand the impact of strategic change on the performance of U.S. urban
hospitals. The researchers used external pressures as contingencies that influence
hospitals to change their strategic direction, leading to changes in performance.
Strategic change was measured as changes in HMO affiliations and contracts along
with strategies to control costs. Performance was measured as changes in market
share, operation efficiencies, and financial performance. The researchers also
incorporated two main groups of control variables: environmental characteristics and
organizational pressures. Environmental characteristics were measured through
competition, population density, and Medicare/non-Medicare HMO market penetration.
Organization pressures were measured through proxies such share of Medicare
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services, stringency of Medicare payment, bed size, case mix severity, occupancy rate,
and for-profit orientation. The researchers found that while hospitals respond with
strategic change when faced with changing contingencies, those changes do not always
result in positive outcomes, at least in the short term (less than 5 years). The
researchers also recognized that changes in strategies to address changes in certain
contingencies might improve one outcome at the expense of another. Such conflict
requires that organizations improve their strategic coordination (Trinh & O’Connor,
2002).
Payne and colleagues (2007) reviewed the relationship between medical groups’
external and internal fit and its impact on financial performance. Fit was assessed
based on the strategy and structure of the type and level services provided for external
fit. Internal fit was based on structural complexity along with realized strategy. Structural
complexity was measured by medical groups’ size and integration with other medical
groups. Realized strategy was measured as funds spent on advertising, travel and
meeting expenses spent toward research and development, and the level of
differentiation and market scope. Financial performance was measured through sales,
equity and investment, assets, and margin and profit. The researchers used four control
variables of regional concentration of competitors, buyers, suppliers, and the general
munificence of the region. Payne and colleagues (2007) found that organizational fit
between strategy and structure was related to medical group financial performance.
The study by Payne and colleagues (2007) is particularly relevant to this study,
as they identified five critical findings: 1) the success of health care organizations is
determined in part by their local markets and the broader health care industry; 2)
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external regulations and payment systems may restrict a health care organization’s
ability to freely select its structure or strategy; 3) within health care, focused strategies
as well as strategies of high differentiation may be more successful than other
organizational strategies; 4) within health care, smaller structures as well as more
flexible structures may be more successful than other organizational structures; and, 5)
the fit of strategy and structure to the external task environment, as well as the fit
between strategy and structure within the organization, can prove to be elusive for
health care organizations. While the researchers assessed the importance of the
contingencies on the fit and performance of medical organizations, the researchers
suggest that it is the contingencies themselves that have a stronger impact on
performance than the potential fit. This study will build upon Payne and colleagues’
(2007) work by focusing on internal and external contingencies that impact the fit and
performance of hospitals, both individually and collectively.
Zinn and colleagues (2007) used contingency theory to evaluate the differences
in performance of nursing homes that had little to no innovation versus those who
engaged in extensive innovation. The researchers used contingency theory as their
framework, citing the idea that as the environment changes, firms will make changes in
their strategy and/or structure, which leads to the implementation of innovations. In turn,
innovation should lead to better environmental fit. Through a contingency theory
framework, the researchers hypothesized that investment in innovations would lead to
improved performance. The researchers evaluated innovation by the changes and
investment in technical innovation by nursing homes. Technical innovation was defined
as innovation that impacted care for residents. The researchers used occupancy rate
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and payer mix along with other measures to evaluate performance. With nursing homes
having gone through substantial changes in case mix in the 1990s, the creation and
expansion of technical programs were deemed to represent the nursing homes
investing in innovation. The researchers did not employ any control variables in this
study. Zinn and colleagues (2007) found significant differences in performance between
nursing homes that engaged in substantial innovation compared to those that did not,
consistent with arguments developed from contingency theory. With the investment in
innovation, nursing homes were able to respond to changes in their market
contingencies and improve their subsequent fit and performance.
In his dissertation, Swofford (2011) evaluated the effects of rural hospital system
affiliations on rural hospital financial performance, applying contingency theory to
assess environmental contingencies, such as hospital affiliations, and the fit between a
rural hospital’s environment and its performance. Swofford (2011) measured financial
performance through hospital total margin and a productive efficiency score using Data
Envelopment Analysis. Environmental contingency was measured through four
contingent relationships which contained two parts, the contingency and the
corresponding organizational structure (Swofford 2011). These four relationships were
1) environmental munificence and system membership 2) hospital location and system
configuration 3) proximity to larger hospital and system hierarchy 4) critical access
hospital status and proximate hierarchical system partner. Swofford (2011) used
hospital characteristics (such as size, ownership types, and teaching status) as well as
environmental and market characteristics as control variables. The study’s results
supported contingency theory overall, particularly with respect to the positive
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relationship between rural hospitals’ system affiliations and improved performance
compared to those without such affiliations. The Swofford dissertation is important for
this study as it clearly how contingency theory is an effective framework for predicting
the relationship between an organization’s structure, its environment, and its financial
performance.
Van De Ven and colleagues (2012) used contingency theory and the concept of
fit to evaluate the effect of organizational factors and corporate-wide policies on the
performance of 32 local community clinics. The researchers hypothesized that greater
corporate control would lead to less independence of local clinics, affecting the ability of
those clinics to make decisions and adapt to local contingencies to maximize their fit
and performance. Thus, the greater the corporate control, the poorer the fit and lower
performance. The contingency of central office influence on the local community clinics
was measured through four measures of clinic autonomy, work standardization, clinicgroup interactions, and headquarters-subsidiary integration, all collected through an
employee survey. Performance, or fit, was measured through net income, productivity,
patient satisfaction, and care quality. Covariates of clinic resources measured through
full-time equivalent positions and clinic environmental complexity measured through the
mix of patient were also used. The researchers found that clinics that had a more
focused clinical population performed better than those who had more broad patient
populations. Clinics with characteristics that were associated with poor performance
performed better under increased corporate involvement and control, and clinics that
had characteristics that were associated with higher performance had less corporate
involvement. The researchers concluded that their findings support contingency theory,
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as organizations that allow subsidiary units to design their business processes to fit their
local environments are able to achieve better performance (Van de Ven et al., 2012).
Shay and Ozcan (2013) used contingency theory as a framework to evaluate
how freestanding inpatient rehabilitation facilities responded to a change in Medicare’s
60% rule. The researchers hypothesized that the 60% rule would result in a substantial
change in rehabilitation facilities’ external contingencies, leading to a change in fit. The
degree of their new fit would be determined based on their organizational characteristics
and how well their structure fit within the new regulatory environment. The researchers
measured fit through the facility’s performance on the Malmquist Index score, calculated
as the product of the change in technical efficiency and the change in technology or
innovation. Several control variables were used including ownership status, regional
location, and local market size. The researchers found that while there was an average
decrease in the index following implementation of the 60% rule, there were a number of
structural characteristics that were found to be associated with higher index scores.
Freestanding, independent, regional facilities demonstrated consistent improved
performance in contrast to the majority of rehabilitation facilities. The researchers noted
that other literature recognizes the difficulty in larger centralized organizations
responding to changes in contingencies and maintaining a level of fit that maximizes
their organization performance, especially in uncertain environments. To better test
contingency theory, the researchers performed a final fit test where they created a
composite score adding relationships that were associated with fit and subtracting those
that were associated with misfit. The researchers found that while there was a
statistically significant difference between the groups that had high fit scores compared
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to those that had low scores, the facilities that had mid-level scores and those with high
scores did not have a statistical difference in their composite scores. This finding
partially supports their hypothesis that organizations with characteristics that fit their
new or changed environmental contingencies are able to be more successful. This
research study will use contingency theory to advance the concept that an
organization’s characteristics will impact its ability to be successful when regulatory
contingencies are changed.
To date, research has shown that contingency theory is an effective framework
for predicting fit in the health care industry. Researchers have found that organizational
structures, interconnecting relationships, and changes in laws and regulations can
directly affect an organization’s fit and subsequent performance. Research has also
shown that financial performance can be effectively measured through operating and
total margins. This research will build off the work and use of contingency theory to date
by applying variables that relate to environmental and organizational contingencies and
evaluating fit through financial performance using margin. By investigating these
relationships and variables, this study will advance the knowledge of regulatory
contingencies, hospital status, and AHC status on their financial performance.
Hospital Contingencies and a Conceptual Model for Fit and Performance Among
AHCs and Non-AHCs
This study’s research questions focus upon the contingencies of regulation,
specifically regulation in the form of the HRRP and VBP programs, and organizational
structures, specifically AHC status as it relates to a hospital’s structure and mission.
Through the use of contingency theory, it can be hypothesized that each hospital will be
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structured to work within their existing contingencies to obtain a high level of
performance. A hospital’s status as an AHC represents a different set of contingent
relationships than non-AHCs. These relationships include the services they offer to
customers, regulatory pressures, the local competitive environment, and unique
contingencies through their tripartite mission and patient populations. These unique
contingencies may result in decreased fit as measured by financial performance
compared to their non-AHC competitors.
With the introduction of new and changing contingencies, such as the
introduction of HRRP and VBP, both groups of hospitals will need to restructure to
maintain performance or face a reduced market fit leading to poorer performance.
HRRP and VBP are environmental contingencies and may cause fit or misfit issues that
will affect organizational performance. The effects of HRRP and VBP are unique to
each hospital since the level of the penalty is related to their performance according to
metrics upon which the penalties are calculated. Additionally, the severity of the penalty,
financially, will depend on that hospital's level of Medicare funding.
A hospital with low Medicare funding coupled with a high penalty rate will
experience less of an impact on their financial performance than a hospital with high
Medicare funding and a high penalty rate. The introduction of HRRP and VBP
represents a potential impact on hospitals’ performance if hospitals do not change their
structure to address it. In the case of AHCs, HRRP and VBP could pose a much larger
impact given their high reliance on Medicare as a payer, their provision of complex
patient care, and the associated costs of their tripartite mission affecting their level of
financial performance. To evaluate if AHCs are more affected by HRRP and VBP
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relative to non-AHCs, operating and total margin will be used as the performance
indicator. A change in the contingencies with a subsequent improvement or no change
in performance, as measured through operating and profit margins, would represent a
hospital changing its organizational structure to match the change in contingencies. This
study will explore the relationship between the contingencies of regulation and AHC
status as the primary independent variables to understand their fit and subsequent
effect on the dependent variables of hospital operating and total margin for the period of
2011 through 2015, as outlined in Figure 2.

External Contingencies
HRRP/VBP

Control Variables
Market Characteristics
Market
Fit

Internal Organization
Structure Contingencies
AHC/non-AHC

Performance
Margin
Control Variables
Hospital Characteristics

Figure 2. Application of contingency theory.
Hypotheses
Research Question 1. Are historical operating and total margins of AHCs
statistically different from non-AHCs?
Based on contingency theory, AHCs and non-AHCs have different contingencies
primarily related to additional demands and expectations from AHCs’ tri-part mission
that lead to different organizational structures affecting performance. Their structures
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will be different due to the difference in contingencies in both costs and revenues.
These contingent relationships lead to the first hypothesis:
H1: AHCs will have statistically different operating and total margins compared to
non-AHCs before (period 1) and after (period 2) the implementation of HRRP and
VBP.
The first research question and hypothesis are important as no research to date
has been performed on AHCs comparing then to non-AHCs on the area of financial
performance through operating and total margin for the two periods referenced. To
better understand this relationship at a high level, a descriptive analysis will be
performed to investigate this hypothesis. This will not address the main question of the
impact of HRRP and VBP on the hospital populations’ financial performance but will
provide valuable feedback if there is a difference. It is expected that there will be a
statistically significant difference in the two populations within and between the two
periods on operating and total margin. If this hypothesis is found to be true, it will
provide a foundation to investigate research question 2.
Research Question 2.
Is the operating and total margins of AHCs more significantly negatively affected from
2011 to 2015, with the implementation of HRRP and VBP, compared to non-AHCs?
Research question 2 will use a multivariate analysis that will assess the impact of
the HRRP and VBP program on AHCs’ and non-AHCs’ operating and total margins over
time. Contingency theory would hypothesize that over time, as contingencies change,
hospitals will adjust their structures to fit new contingencies and improve their
performance in the environment. Non-AHCs will be able to adapt to their changed
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contingencies by restructuring to better deal with their environmental changes through
payer mix, cost savings, and other initiatives. AHCs will not have the same ability to
change due to their dependence on Medicare payments and high mission-related costs
that limit their ability to change. As the penalties increase over time, they will see a
larger decline in their financial performance, leading to the third hypothesis:
H2: AHCs will experience a larger negative impact on their operating and total
margins after the implementation of HRRP and VBP when compared to nonAHCs.
Control Variables
As with previous research, it is important to control for other factors that may
influence a hospital’s financial performance. Research, outlined further in the literature
review section titled Prior Research on Hospital Profitability, has identified factors such
as a hospital’s location and its state’s expansion of Medicaid that may influence
financial performance. To address these other factors, this study will control for state
Medicaid expansion, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on competitiveness, not for profit and
for profit status, and health system affiliation.
As a result of the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid expansion increased eligibility to
include all individuals below 138 percent of the federal poverty level (Gottlied &
Shepard, 2017), growing the Medicaid population from 34.2 million in 2001 to 55 million
in 2013 (Wachino et al., 2014). To make the program more financially acceptable to
states, newly eligible adults (parents and childless adults) would have their costs funded
100% by the federal government from 2014 to 2015. The federal funding rate would
then drop to 95% in 2017 followed by rates of 94, 93, and 90 percent in the subsequent
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years, stopping at 90% in 2020 and later years (MECPAC, 2018). The expansion was
complicated when the Supreme Court ruled in National Federation of Independent
Business V. Sebelius that the federal government could not require the states to expand
Medicaid (C. Thomas, 2012).
The Medicaid expansion judgment caused a parting of the states in their
implementation of Medicare expansion. As of March 2014, 29 states and the District of
Columbia had expanded Medicaid (Wachino et al., 2014). A study found that hospitals
in states that expanded Medicaid saw a $5 million increase in Medicaid revenue, a $3.2
million decrease in uncompensated care, and operating margins improved by 2.5%
(Blavin, 2017). The Kaiser Family Foundation also found that uncompensated care
costs were relatively equal among states before the Medicaid expansion but have since
declined by $2.0 million in expansion states and increased by $180,000 in nonexpansion states (Antonisse, Garfield, Artiga, & Rudowitz, 2017). These studies show
the impactful effect that Medicaid expansion can have on hospital profitability. To control
for this factor, this study will incorporate a variable for the expansion of Medicaid each
year by state for each hospital.
Another variable that previous research has controlled for has been the
competitiveness of the environment. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a
commonly accepted measure of market concentration and is often used in healthcare
research for hospital market competitiveness (Wright, Tergas, & Hou, 2016). HHI is
used by the U.S. Justice Department to evaluate the effect on the competitiveness of
markets for potential acquisitions and mergers (Investopedia, 2003). HHI is used to
understand the impact of market competitiveness on the performance of an
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organization. As the market becomes more competitive, hospitals will have to compete
on price and services, thereby affecting their financial performance. A lower HHI is an
indication that market concentration is decreasing and competition is increasing which
can led to lower financial performance. To control for this, this study will use the HHI
measured at a county level as a control variable.
In addition to external influences, a hospital’s structure and business models can
impact their financial performance. The healthcare industry consists of three primary
business models for hospitals: government, not for profit, and for-profit (Becker, 2014;
Horwitz, 2005). These hospitals provide standard levels of care to their patient
populations but do so with different business models. Not for profit (NFP) and for-profit
(FP) hospitals are the most common, and are often the most compared (Horwitz, 2005).
The FP business model is defined as a corporation that offers ownership shares and is
primary responsible to its shareholders who are often profit driven individuals. (Anand,
2012). A NFP organization is prohibited from selling shares and has responsibility to a
variaty of stakeholders and whos main purpose is one of a chariable nature (Anand,
2012). It is common to see NFP hospitals focus on providing care for underserved
populations by being located in areas that do not have the most affluent patient mix
(Becker, 2014). FP hospitals are commonly located in areas that are more affluent with
a patient population that has insurance, allowing them to pay at a higher rate (Becker,
2014). Additionally, there are differences observed across both hospital forms, with
some FP hospitals operating in ways that aggressively target affluent markets, while
examples of NFP hospitals exist that aim to truly help their communities beyond the
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profit motive (Galewitz, 2015). Due to the differing missions and profit motives, profit
status is included as a control variable.
Profit status is not the only structure that can influence a hospital’s financial
performance. A hospital’s membership as part of a larger health care network has been
found to be correlated with higher profitability due to economies of scale and bargaining
power that is obtained when one is part of a larger group (Swofford, 2011). Bazzoli and
colleagues (2000) found that hospitals that were not in health care networks had higher
costs overall compared to those that were in a network. Additionally, the researchers
found that hospitals in a network or system were more profitable with lower costs.
Hospitals that were not in networks were among the least profitable hospitals. Finally,
the study found that hospitals that were part of a larger network were in a better position
to pay long-term obligations (Bazzoli et al., 2000). In a more recent study, it was found
that hospitals that were affiliated with a larger system with greater regional power were
more profitable (Bai & Anderson, 2016). The study also found that hospitals that were
part of a larger system could negotiate a higher price (Bai & Anderson, 2016). These
studies demonstrate the power that structure can have on a hospital’s profitability. This
study will incorporate a control variable for hospital system affiliation to control for this
factor.
Summary of Theoretical Framework
This study uses the theoretical framework of contingency theory to investigate
the impact HRRP and VBP has had on AHCs compared to non-AHCs. Contingency
theory provides a structure to address organizational design and how that design is
responsive to an organization’s environment. An organization’s performance is directly
related to that organization’s ability to find fit with its environment. Contingency theory
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recognizes an organization’s environment through external and internal contingencies.
Contingencies are influences that cause an organization to respond and develop its
strategy to maximize its ability to achieve fit and high performance. Thus, differences in
how organizations respond to their environmental contingencies will impact their ability
to achieve fit.
This study conceptualizes contingences through two factors, an internal factor
and an external factor, operationalizing them as the study’s independent variables. The
external contingency is the combined HRRP and VBP program, and the internal
contingency is AHC or non-AHC designation. The study employs operating and total
margin as the dependent variables. When combined, these contingent relationships
provide a conceptual model for AHCs’ fit or misfit with their environment and their ability
to maximize performance. The study will follow previous research using other factors as
control variables. These control variables are classified as market characteristics (HHI
and Medicaid expansion) and hospital characteristics (health system affiliation and
ownership structure).
From this conceptual model, two hypotheses are derived. Each of the two
hypotheses will be tested using statistical analysis to investigate the research questions.
The subsequent chapter will address the identification and measurement of variables
that represent the constructs in the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter. It will
also outline the procedures for testing the hypotheses.
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Chapter 4: Methods
The following chapter will discuss the research design, threats to internal and
external validity, data sources, study population, the variables and how they will be
measured, analytic methods, and limitations of the study.
Research Design
This study is a non-randomized, quasi-experimental, retrospective study. Figure
3 depicts the study design. Historical and longitudinal data are used to review the
impact of HRRP and VBP on hospital operating and total margins over a period of time.
The study period covers 2011 through 2015 with independent, dependent, and control
variables measured in each year. The primary objective is to demonstrate the unique
financial performance of AHCs compared to non-AHCs and elucidate the impact HRRP
and VBP have on AHCs’ long-term operating and total margins.
The first stage is the comparison of financial performance between AHCs and
non-AHC’s prior to and after HRRP and VBP. The comparison is important to determine
a baseline of performance before the contingencies of HRRP and VBP would have
affected the hospitals’ environments. By understanding hospital performance prior to
these policies, there can be a comparison after these policies. This first stage of
descriptive analysis will set the stage for the exploration in the study’s research
questions.
To analyze the research questions, the study will follow Donaldson’s (2001)
recommendation for contingency theory, which recommends lagging the performance
measures that are used to evaluate performance. Therefore, hospital performance
measures will be taken during the duration for the study period of 2011 through 2015.
For the study period of 2011 and 2012, the performance measures are in isolation of
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penalty rates, as HRRP and VBP were not yet implemented. For the study period from
2013 through 2015, as HRRP and VBP are implemented, a net penalty rate for HRRP
and VBP will be taken to measure the impact on hospital performance. By using a twostage process, it will be possible to evaluate the effect of HRRP and VBP on AHCs’
operating and total margins compared to non-AHCs.
Quasi-Experimental Retrospective Design
Performance
measures Pre `
HRRP/VBP

Three years of
performance measures
for each hospital

2011

2012

AHCs

O1

O2

HRRP/
VBP
X

Non-AHCs

O1

O2

X

Hospitals are
either an AHC or
not an AHC

2013

2014

2015

O3

O4

O5

O3

O4

O5

Implementation of
HRRP and VBP

Figure 3. Visualization of study design from 2011 through 2015.
Threats to Internal and External Validity
The quasi-experimental retrospective design is a common design with hospital
financial performance research. However, with this study, there are some threats to
internal and external validity that limit the ability of this design to establish causality. The
potential threats include testing, instrumentation, selection bias, regression, history,
maturation, measurement, and attrition. How these validity concerns will be minimized
will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
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Threats that are minimized through the study design include testing, instrumentation,
selection bias, and regression. Testing validity refers to the effect on performance on a
posttest because a pretest was taken; the act of collecting data on people or
organizations changes them. The study design eliminates the testing threat as all data
is retrospectively collected. Subsequently, even though the study measures the
performance of hospitals prior to the implementation of HRRP and VBP, the collection
of the data will not influence the performance post HRRP and VBP.
Instrumentation validity refers to the changes in measuring instruments or
methods of measurement between two points of data collection. The instrumentation
threat can occur even if the same instrument is used. The instrumentation threat is
similar to criterion validity, if the measure is related to the outcome. In other words, the
degree to which scores on an instrument are correlated with some external criterion. To
combat the instrumentation issue, the study will use methods with high test-retest
reliability and that have been shown to relate to hospital financial performance; margin.
Margin has been shown to be a reliable measure for hospital financial performance. For
more information on these findings refer to the Methods Chapter section on the
Measurement of Variables subsection Hospital Profitability and Dependent Variables.
Selection bias, another threat, arises due to a factor that is unobserved and thus
cannot be controlled for affecting decisions to participate in something versus not to
participate. Selection bias is an omitted variable issue. Selection bias is most
problematic and frequently encountered when a study does not use an experimental
design. Selection bias is not an issue for this study as the study focuses on the
difference between hospital groups, AHCs and non-AHCs, which is not a factor that
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changes. This is due to the commitment of resources, accreditation process, and
reason for a hospital’s creation, which is required to become an AHC or non-AHC. Once
a type of hospital is created it does not typically change. These reasons and the use of
covariates in the statistical analysis will reduce potential selection bias.
Finally, regression validity is the tendency of posttest measures to return to
population averages. Regression validity often occurs when groups are selected based
on pre-test scores. The study addresses regression validity through group selection
based on AHC verses non-AHC and does not rely on pre-test scores.
Threats that are minimized through the use of covariates are history and
maturation. The history threat refers to the occurrence of external events that take place
concurrently with the independent variable that can affect the dependent variable.
History threat takes the form of other actions that can affect a hospital’s profitability.
These can be items like other regulations, the economy, market competitiveness, or
ownership structure. A key to the success of the project is to isolate many of those
variables as possible, specifically by controlling for various types of variables such as
location and regional competitiveness. See more below on the control variables used.
Similar to the history threat, maturation occurs within subjects during the course
of a study as a result of the passage of time rather than as a result of a treatment or
independent variable. Maturation occurs as a function of time. To address maturation,
the study design employs a comparison group model. This refers to the two groups of
hospitals being compared during the same periods of time. Any actions that impact one
group over the time will have the same effect on the other group. This helps to have
these two hospitals as comparable as possible for this study.
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Another challenge in the study that relates to history and maturation threats is
how the HRRP program was implemented with the readmission rate penalties being
staged over time increasing one percent over three years to a maximum of 3%. The rate
increase poses a problem as the penalties will affect profitability for each hospital
differently over the course of those three years. To address the issue of these threats
pre/post design will take data from 2011 (prior to the implementation of both events)
through 2015.
Threats to validity that remain are measurement and attrition. Measurement
validity refers to the ability of the tool to measure what it purports to measure. The
measurement validity threat is a challenge for the study for several reasons; the first
being the way financial data is reported. Data reporting on Hospital Compare and the
Medicare cost reports is self-reported by the hospitals and may be inaccurate or
inconsistent. To resolve the threat, the data will be reviewed for outliers and
inconsistences. If outliers and/or inconsistences are found their traits and characteristics
will be analyzed and their impact on the analyses determined. Based on this analysis
they may remain in the study or may be removed.
The second issue related to measurement is the need to combine data from
multiple sources. Data is collected by various groups and, defining common variables
that will link various data sets, is critical for accuracy and consistencies in the analysis.
To address the data issue, the study will use Medicare provider number and American
Hospital Association identification number, common metrics and variables included in
most data tables, to combine information. In instances where the Medicare or AHA
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provider number is not available, hospital names and locations/addresses will be used
to match hospital data.
The threat of attrition occurs when members of groups fall out over the course of
the study, which can cause groups to lose comparability. The risk is greatest when the
length of time between data collection points is long. If attrition occurs randomly, then
there is no bias and not an issue with the validity of the study. However, if it is not
random or is widespread, then the comparison of the groups is threatened. Attrition will
be prevented by reviewing the groups and membership thoroughly before the conduct
of statistical analysis. Each hospital that drops out of the study will be analyzed through
descriptive statistics to ensure other factors are not influencing the attrition that may
skew the data.
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Table 1
Threats to Internal Validity
Threat
Testing

Mitigating Factor
Study design through the use of a
retrospective study

Use of margin as a performance
Instrumentation measure, a proven measure used in
similar studies
Grouping of hospitals based solely
on COTH AHC status and use of
Selection Bias
covariates to control for other
factors
Regression
History
Maturation

Use of two groups, AHC and nonAHC and not relying on pre-test
results
Use of control variables
Use of comparison groups

Measurement

Data review for outliers and
inconsistences and use Medicare
provider number for accuracy and
consistency in the analysis

Attrition

Review data set for issues that may
have caused hospitals to drop out
of the analysis

Data Sources
The data for will come from several sources including the Medicare Cost Report
Information System Minimum Data Set (HCRIS MDS), AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals,
and American Association of Medical Colleges Council of Teaching Hospitals and
Health Systems (AAMC COTH) reporting, and state data on Medicaid expansion.
The dependent variable of operating and total margin will be calculated using
financial data from HCRIS MDS for each fiscal year from 2011 through 2015. The
financial data is publicly available through CMS and provides key information on
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hospital sales and services and costs to calculate operating and total margin. The
operating and total margin data will be used to calculate each hospital’s performance
before and after the implementation of HRRP and VBP.
The independent variables of HRRP and VBP penalty rates will be taken from
Medicare data. The data and penalty rate information will be combined for a net score,
allowing for the calculation of the penalty rates and a single impact as it affects
hospitals. Each year of HRRP and VBP penalties will be paired with the corresponding
fiscal year it was applied. For more information on the combination of the two variables,
refer to the Methods Chapter section on the Measurement of Variables subsection
Independent Variables.
The variable of AHC will be taken from AAMC COTH reports as of January of
2018. The COTH listing will be cross referenced on the AHA reports which also includes
an indicator for COTH teaching hospital for each year of data. The data validation
process will ensure consistency of reporting for COTH members and an accurate listing
of applicable hospitals.
The covariate variables of not-for-profit and for-profit status along with health
system affiliation will be taken from AHA Annual Survey data. These data provide
various metrics and key demographics of US hospitals and provide data by year
allowing for the collection and use of data from 2011 through 2015. Information on
Medicaid expansion by state will be obtained through the Kaiser Family Foundation
reporting on Status of State Action of the Medicaid Expansion Decision. The Kaiser
Family Foundation report is regularly updated when changes occur and states expand
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Medicaid, as Virginia did in 2018. The report provides valuable information on the date
the expansions went into effect allowing for the historical comparison.
The Herfindahl-Herfindahl Index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration and
is calculated through the sum of squared market shares. The results range from zero to
1. An HHI of less than .15 is considered a competitive marketplace, .15 to .25 is
moderately concentrated, and .25 and higher is considered to be highly concentrated
(Wright et al., 2016). Data to calculate the HHI on competitiveness is available through
the American Hospital Association Annual Survey. HHI for this study was calculated
based on admission at the county level. The data has been compiled by the VCU Health
Administration department and will be used in the study’s analysis. Once the data are
obtained from these multiple sources, they will be organized by a common field of
Medicare provider number. Medicare provider number is a standard federally assigned
identifier that will allow for the combination of data from multiple sources.
Study Population and Sampling Strategy
The studies sampling strategy is to maximize the number of comparable
hospitals years in the sample. Data is publically available and is required to be reported
to CMS by almost all hospitals. The study population includes all non-federal, acute
care, urban hospitals that are eligible for the HRRP and VBP under the CMS final rule
within the United States from 2011 through 2015 (CMS C, 2011). 2011 and 2012 will be
used as the comparable years since HRRP and VBP did not take effect until 2013. By
using two years of historical data, prior to HRRP and VBP, the study will have a large
recent population to compare to. Going further into the past may cause other historical
factors to be included that cannot be controlled for affecting the study results.
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2013 through 2015 are used to assess the impact of HRRP and VBP on hospital
operating and total margins. This time frame is used as 2013 was the first year of these
programs and 2015 is the last year used since it is the most recent data set available.
Using the three years of data is also beneficial as it will capture the penalty increase
from a maximum of 1% in 2013 to a maximum of 3% in 2015. Finally, five years of data
should provide a significant study population and allow for the degrees of freedom
required without sacrificing power.
Urban and non-urban status will be determined through the Medicare designation
as outlined in the impact file from CMS. The two primary groups of interest are AHCs
and non-AHCs, both of which were affected by HRRP and VBP and regularly report
their information as part of the Medicare Cost Reports program.
While the primary group of interest is hospitals that were active and in service
from 2011 through 2015, ones that were no longer in service will be reviewed to better
understand the reason for the change. Some could be products of hospital mergers or
closures due to financial trouble. A benefit of using such a broad group is that all AHCs
and non-AHCs are able to be a part of the study.
As noted in the literature review section, determining what “is” an AHC can be a
challenge. To address the AHC issue, the study will use the American Association of
Medical Colleges’ full members of the Council of Teaching Hospital and Health Systems
(COTH) listing of teaching hospitals in the United States. Full members are used for the
study as other hospitals can be members but are not considered full members if they do
not meet the full criteria. For more information on the membership requirements, refer to
the literature section Academic Health Centers Overview. As of February 2018, there
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were 221 full COTH members that were eligible for HRRP and VBP. The use of all
available COTH and HRRP/VBP eligible urban hospitals strengthens the power of the
study and its generalizability.
With these parameters, the study population started with a total of 3,693 total
hospitals across all years. Under CMS’s rule, there were 3,414 hospitals that were
eligible for HRRP and VBP in all years 2013 through 2015. Hospitals that were added or
removed from any of the three years will not be included in the final analysis. From the
data set, there were 2,406 hospitals that were designated by CMS as ‘urban’. Hospitals
that were not classified as ‘urban’ will be removed from the study population. Urban
includes the CMS designation of ‘LURBAN’ and ‘OURBAN’. There are three COTH
hospitals that will be removed from the study population as they are designated as rural
hospitals. The remaining hospitals will be examined to identify ones with missing data
elements, extreme values, and/or nonsensical data values.
Extreme values will be defined as ones with that are more than three standard
deviations from the variable mean and will be reviewed to determine their influence on
the analyses. If hospitals have significant missing data included the independent,
dependent variables they will be eliminated from the sample.
Measurement of Variables
Following the conceptual framework outlined in chapter 3, the study uses
constructs of hospital performance measured by operating and total margins to analyze
the effect of HRRP and VBP on AHCs compared to non-AHCs. The section outlines the
variables that will be used to conduct statistic testing of the hypothesis.
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Hospital profitability and dependent variables. Assessing the influence of
multiple factors affecting hospital profitability is not uncommon in hospital research.
When examining hospital profitability, common financial metrics are used that can be
standardized across multiple types of providers. Common profitability measures are: net
income from patient care services; the sum of government appropriations; the difference
between net patient revenues and total operating expenses; operating and total
margins, return on total assets; and financial flexibility ratios (Bai & Anderson, 2016;
Cleverley, 1994; Cleverley & Harvey, 1992).
Different studies have used multiple types of financial measures to determine the
financial health of hospitals. When working with hospital profitability related to HRRP,
financial operating and total margins have been the primary metric used (Bazzoli et al.,
2018; Chen et al., 2017; Gu et al., 2014). The use of financial margin is prevalent as it
allows for the analysis of the financial health of a hospital regardless of the size or
complexity of the services they provide. Additionally, margin is easier to calculate for a
representative sample. Financial margin allows the review of each hospital and
represents the ability of that hospital to generate revenues while keeping costs low
(Solution Matrix Ltd, 2016).
Financial margin is calculated as revenue minus cost in obtaining that revenue.
The product of the calculation is referred to as “net revenue.” Net revenue is then
divided by revenue and then multiplied by 100 to calculate the margin (Chen et al.,
2017).
When working with hospitals, financial margin can be calculated in two different
ways. The first is performed taking total patient revenues minus contractual
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allowances/discounts on patients accounts and total operating expenses then dividing
that product by total patient revenues. The calculation is referred to as operating margin
as it focuses on the primary operating revenues and expenses related to patient care.
Operating margin can be an important measure if the researchers are only focused on
the patient care activities of the hospital.
In contrast, margin can be calculated by using total revenue minus total
expenses and dividing that product by total revenue. The product is referred to as total
margin as it the same components as operating margin with inclusion of other revenue
such as donations, investment income, parking lot receipts, rental of space, among
other revenue items along with the expenses for operating non-patient care activities.
The final calculation includes all revenues and expenses related to a hospital. (Chen et
al., 2017). The calculation will show the complete financial health of a hospital including
all revenue streams. Much like operating margin, total margin can be an important
indicator of total health of a hospital and demonstrate the ability of a hospital to remain
financially healthy despite potential losses based solely on operating costs and
revenues.
In the context of the study, both measures will be used allowing for the analysis
of HRRP and VBP on the operations of a hospital and on the total flow of funds. By
examining total margin, one can investigate the ability of hospitals to raise and use
other funds, such as philanthropy, to supplement decreases in their core operations.
An article by Kruse et al. (Kruse, Polsky, Stuart, & Werner, 2012), used total
margin to evaluate Medicare’s pay for performance programs. The researchers
examined revenues and costs separately to evaluate the program’s impact. They
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calculated hospital total margins as the difference between hospital total revenues and
total costs. In the study, hospital total margin was shown to be a valuable indicator of
financial health of hospitals. Hospital operating and total margin will be calculated and
incorporated in the analysis form 2011 through 2015 to allow for the comparison of
change year to year.
Independent variables. The independent variables for the analysis will be
HRRP penalty rates, VBP incentive rates, and hospital type. HRRP penalty rates will be
recorded as the actual assessed penalty rates for each hospital. These rates range from
0% to 1% in 2013, 0% to 2% in 2014, and 0% to 3% in 2014 and 2015. In terms of VBP,
hospitals were docked 2% of annual Medicare operating revenues with the potential to
earn back up to 3% of their Medicare revenues. If a hospital received no incentive
credit, their net effect would be a -2% reduction in revenues. If they received the full
credit, they would receive an additional 3% on top of their Medicare revenues. The
combine net effect of these two programs could mean a potential penalty rate of up to 5% (-2% VBP and -3% HRRP in 2013) or a net positive of up to 3% (3% VBP and 0%
HRRP).
By combining these two programs, the study will explore the net effect of these
two programs on operating and total margin. The combined variable will be a
continuous variable and will be coded based on the combined metric.
The independent variable of hospital type is based on AHC or non-AHC from the
COTH membership listing. The AHC variable will be coded as a dichotomous variable
with “1” being an AHC and “0” not.
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Control variables. In line with other research, the study will control for several
variables historically linked with hospital profitability. These variables related to market
characteristics and hospital characteristics. Market characteristics include HHI on
competitiveness and each US states status on Medicaid expansion. Medicaid
expansion will be recorded for each year taking into consideration the staggered
implementation of Medicaid by the states. Hospital characteristics will comprise of
health system affiliation and ownership structure (public, for-profit, and not-for-profit).
Market characteristics of HHI and Medicaid expansion will be used to control for
instances of external influences on hospital financial performance. HHI is calculated for
each year 2011 through 2015 from county level data and is used to control for a market
competitiveness. The variable is a continuous measure equal to the sum of squared
county level market shares. Medicaid expansion will be used in each of the five years of
the analysis. The variable will be updated as states expand Medicaid and will be coded
as a dichotomous variable with “1” being an expanded and “0” not.
Hospital characteristics of health system affiliation will be coded as a
dichotomous variable with “1” being a part of a system and “0” being not. The variable
will be updated and taken annually to account for any hospital that may have changed
their status with regard to system membership. The system affiliation and ownership
structure have been shown to impact profitability through more purchasing power and
economies of scale, along with different missions that can focus more on profit
generation. The variable of ownership structure is based on the American Hospital
Association designations. The hospitals that are included in this study are public (state
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or government owned/operating), for-profit, and not-for-profit. Ownership structure will
be coded with “1” being public, “2” being for-profit, and “3” being not-for-profit. The
variable will also be updated annually in case there are instances of hospitals change
ownership structures. The variable is important as for profit entities have been shown to
have more of a motivation to raise revenues and reduce costs while not for profit are
more mission and community focused with less attention toward profit. By controlling for
these variables, we will be able to better isolate the impact that HRRP and VBP has had
on hospital profitability. Table 2 provides a summary of the variables included in this
study and their construction.
Table 2
Overview of Variable Construction
Variable
Dependent Variables
Total Margin

Operating Margin

Data Source
CMS HCRIS MDS
(2011-2015)

CMS HCRIS MDS
(2011-2015)

Independent Variables
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Construction
Calculated for each fiscal year
based on total patient and
other revenue minus total
expenses divided by total
patient and other revenue with
a variable range from -.69
through .64 for all years
Calculated for each fiscal year
based total patient revenue
minus contractual allowances,
discounts on patients
accounts and total operating
expenses by total patient
revenue with a variable range
from -1.17 through .67 for all
years

Combined Rate for
Value Based Purchasing and
Hospital Readmission Rate
Penalty

Hospital Type

Covariates
Competition

Reporting from
Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid (20132015)

Percentage combined rate is
the HRRP penalty rate plus
the assessed VBP rate
creating a combined rate
range from -3% to +3% in
2013, -4% to +3% in 2014,
and -5% to +3% in 2015 using
the actual adjusted
percentage
American Association Dummy coded COTH
of Colleges of
Academic Health Center
Medicine (January
status as 1=COTH AHC
2018)
hospital 0=Non-COTH AHC
hospital

American Hospital
Association Annual
Survey (2011-2015)

Calculated HHI as the sum of
squared county level market
shares and represented as a
continuous variable from .04
to 1.
Dummy coded status of
Medicaid expansion in each
state assessed each year as
0=not expanded 1=expanded

Medicaid Expansion

Kaiser Family
Foundation Report
(2012-2015)

Health System Affiliation

American Hospital
Association Annual
Survey (2011-2015)

Dummy coded status as part
of a health system in each
year; 1=Part of a health
system 0=Not part of a health
system

American Hospital
Association Annual
Survey (2011-2015)
American Hospital
Association Annual
Survey (2011-2015)
American Hospital
Association Annual
Survey (2011-2015)

Dummy coded ownership
status as a 1 if public in each
year
Dummy coded ownership
status as a 2 if for-profit in
each year
Dummy coded ownership
status as a 3 if not-for-profit in
each year

Ownership Structure
Public

For-Profit

Not-For-Profit
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Variable management. Once the data is organized, all variables will be plotted
to review consistency of data and outliers and will be tested for issues of
multicollinearity. Data outliers and inconsistencies will be reviewed and evaluated, using
SPSS with descriptive statistics. The data will also be tested to ensure the predictors
are linear with the dependent variables. The study data will be managed in SPSS. The
benefit to the data management process used for the study is that the same rules and
data transformations can be done to a small sample just as easily as they can be done
to the entire population. Since there is no benefit to reducing the size of the population,
the study will use the entire available hospital population.
Analytic Methods
To address the two research questions, two separate statistical analyses will be
performed. The following sections outline those analyses as the related to the research
questions and hypotheses.
Research question 1. Are historical operating and total margins of AHCs
statistically different from non-AHCs?
Hypothesis: AHCs will have statistically different operating and total margins compared
to non-AHCs before (period 1) and after (period 2) the implementation of HRRP and
VBP.
Before the study can address the second research question, there will be a
preliminary descriptive data analysis and investigation into the differences between
AHCs and non-AHCs prior to and after HRRP and VBP. The initial analysis will consist
of comparing the two hospital groups on financial operating and total margin in these
two periods with no control variables and without the HRRP/VBP penalty rates. The first
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stage analysis is important as it will provide a descriptive, global, analysis of the two
hospital groups. The analysis will answer an important question: Are historical financial
operating and total margins of AHCs statistically different from non-AHCs? The answer
to the question will establish if there is a statistical difference across these two hospital
types.
To address research question one, a repeated measures analysis of variance
(RMANOVA) model will be used, with the independent variable being period with the
dependent variable being hospital operating and total margin. The data will be
structured so that each year represents an independent sample of the data and metrics.
This will solve an issue of missing data in individual years, as is an issue with these
varying data sources and the long term recording of the data. By allowing individual
years of data to be excluded without losing the entire hospital this study is able to
maintain a larger sample size. The RMANOVA model will be a two-way model including
the interaction between the two factors (hospital-type and period). The between units
factor is Hospital-Type (AHC or non-AHC) and the within unit factor is period (Period 1
is years 2011-2012 (Pre-HRRP and VBP), Period 2 is years 2013-2015 (post-HRRP
and VBP)). The analysis will be conducted twice with operating and total margin as the
dependent variables.
Research question 2. Once the initial question is answered, the study will
address the primary research question:
Is the operating and total margins of AHCs more significantly negatively affected from
2011 to 2015, with the implementation of HRRP and VBP, compared to non-AHCs?
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Hypothesis: AHCs will experience a larger negative impact on their operating and total
margins after the implementation of HRRP and VBP when compared to non-AHCs.
A RMANCOVA model will be used to analyze the main hypothesis, with
independent variables being year, hospital-type, and the combined HRRP and VBP
penalty rates with the dependent variables being hospital operating and total margin.
The RMANCOVA model combines both ANOVA and regression in the predictive model.
A benefit of the RMANCOVA is that each year’s penalty rate is incorporated into the
prediction model for margin. The RMANCOVA model will include a between units factor
(Hospital-Type; AHC or non-AHC) and a within units factor (Year: 2011, 2012, 2013,
2014, and 2015 along with combination of HRRP penalties and VBP incentives), as well
as the interaction between hospital type, HRRP and VBP penalty, and year. The model
will then be adjusted for covariates, mentioned earlier in the chapter, to determine a
predictive model for margin. The level of the change will be determined by the final
formulaic model produced by the RMANCOVA along with the F-value.
Limitations of the Study Methods
As with any research project, there are many challenges faced in the empirical
analysis, to have an effective study, these challenges must be understood and
addressed prior to undertaking the study. A drawback of stage one of the analysis is the
focus on the difference in period one and two and not the cause of the difference. While
the two periods are based on the pre and post implementation of HRRP and VBP, there
could be other factors influencing the change. The other factors that can impact
profitability are addressed in the second hypothesis where covariates along with the use
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of the actual years (not periods) and actual HRRP and VBP penalty rates are used for
each hospital to better understand unique HRRP and VBP impact.
The study being able to control for all actions that can impact a hospital’s
financial health is yet another concern. Over the five years of data there were market
changes such as other changes in health care policy and laws, along with other market
impacts that could have an effect on hospital profitability. The issue around what
impacts financial performance is a common problem often found in research relating to
organization performance, and controlling for other variables will help reduce the issue.
However, it is impossible to control for all variables that can affect every hospital. If
through the evaluation of the hypotheses and their statistical tests (outlined above) it is
found that unobserved variables account for a materially significant amount of variation
and econometric analysis is required then panel data will be used through SPSS
Estimator to address these other variables. The large data set will help to address the
performance measurement issue as all similar hospitals should be impacted by similar
changes in the environment.
A common limitation that the study and other studies face in organizational
research is the use of secondary data. As mentioned earlier the Medicare Cost Report,
data is self-reported and can have issues with reported values as they only receive desk
reviews by CMS (Guadagnino, 2012). Additionally, the metrics and other information are
from reports collected by other agencies and associations. To address the secondary
data issue, control variables and data will need to be reviewed for outliers to ensure its
consistency.
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Summary of the Methods Chapter
This chapter describes the methods used to address the two research questions
through two stages of analysis. The research design has been selected to mitigate
threats to internal and external validity. The data sources and study population along
with the sampling strategy have been selected to minimize error and provide a
representative sample to address the research questions. Finally, the measurement of
the variables and analytical methods allow for testing of the hypothesis. The follow
chapters will present the study results and provide a discussion of those results.
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Chapter 5: Results
The results chapter outlines the preparation of the data for analysis and the
results of the statistical tests for each of the research questions. The first section of the
chapter will discuss how the data was managed, the method for excluding hospital
years, an analysis on missing data and data outliers, along with descriptive statistics for
all variables. The second section discusses the statistical tests that were used, and
how JMP was implemented to perform them. The third section presents the results of
the statistical tests for each research question. The fourth section presents additional
analyses that were performed as a follow-up to the main analysis for the research
questions. The chapter concludes with a summary of the results.
Data Preparation and Calculation of Study Measures
Data management. When completely compiled, the overall data set for the study
consisted of 3,693 total hospitals, with instances of data from 2011 through 2015,
creating the potential for 18,465 data points, with 1,175 being AHC hospital years. With
this quantity of data being compiled from several sources, there were many instances of
missing data over the five years for the sample. To prevent excluding a single hospital
for all five years, when only select data was missing, each hospital and its
characteristics were broken down into per year instances. For example, each hospital
would have five lines of data, each line representing a separate year from 2011 through
2015. This allows for the elimination of a single year of data due to missing values or
meeting exclusion criteria, which maximizes the sample.
The data was merged using the Medicare ID field. The multiple data sources all
provided Medicare ID, which allowed for the compilation of data. All data was calculated
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and prepared in line with the methods section, as outlined in Table 2. One additional
variable, a ‘wave’ dummy variable, was added to assist in the use of JMP in statistically
testing the data. Wave was calculated as the year minus ‘2010’ to create a value of 1
through 5 for each year 2011 through 2015. This assisted in the linear modeling for JMP
by identifying which Medicare ID records were repeating themselves through the study
period.
The combined rate for VBP and HRRP was used as one of the primary
independent variables, but the individual rates for VBP and HRRP were included in the
data set to allow for additional supplementary analysis to investigate the impact of these
programs on the hospitals’ financial viability. All values for each hospital year were used
as unique values and were not averaged over several years.
Exclusions. Hospitals were first screened on the exclusion criteria of ‘rural’, as
identified through the AHA designation. In the methods section of the study, it was
outlined that the study population would only include urban hospitals, as AHCs are
primarily located in urban settings. Prior research has shown a difference in the
profitability of urban versus rural hospitals, and the inclusion of rural hospital types has
the potential to skew the data (Bai & Anderson, 2016). Upon review of the data, there
were a total of 4,737 hospital years where hospitals were designated as being located in
the AHA variable of ‘rural’, 14 of which were AHCs and were removed.
Next, hospitals that had missing data points for total margin and operating
margin, the primary dependent variables, were eliminated. This removed 3,066 hospital
years, including 164 AHC years. Missing years of the combined VBP and HRRP rates
were also eliminated. This removed 70 hospital years, none of which were AHC hospital
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years. Puerto Rico’s hospital years were eliminated as they are outside of the United
States, the focus of the study. This eliminated 212 hospital years, none of which were
AHC. There were 223 hospital years (6 AHC years) of other instances of missing data in
health system affiliation, hospital ownership structure, and HHI. This brought the total
study population to 10,157 hospital years, including 991 AHC hospital years.
Descriptive statistics. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the
dichotomous variables.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Dichotomous Variables
Variable
Independent Variables
Hospital Type
AHC
Non-AHC
Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Number Proportion

991
9166

9.8%
90.2%

2050
2251
2246
2247
1363

20.2%
22.2%
22.1%
22.1%
13.4%

Covariates
Medicaid Expansion*
Expanded Medicaid
2779
27.4%
Not Expanded Medicaid
7378
72.6%
Health System Affiliation
Affiliated
2972
70.7%
Not Affiliated
7185
29.3%
Ownership Structure
Public
1138
11.2%
For-Profit
2516
24.8%
Not-For-Profit
6503
64.0%
*Medicaid expansion based on all hospital years in the dataset
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Overall, the AHC population consisted of 991 hospital years (9.8%) of the 10,157
total hospital years. The result is to be expected, as there are significantly fewer AHCs
than non-AHCs. The variable of year had an even distribution of hospital years from
2011 through 2014, with the exception of 2015. 2015 irregularity is due to the HCRIS
data, and the level of missing data in 2015, compared to other years. It is to be
expected since it is the most recent year of reporting and data for this year are still in
process of being reviewed and posted. Medicaid expansion only accounted for 2,279
(27%) of the hospital years. The distribution is expected due to the slow adoption of
Medicaid expansion in the US from 2012 through 2015 (Chen et al. 2017). When
reviewing health system affiliation, 2,972 (71%) of hospitals were affiliated with these
systems. The majority of the hospitals (64%) were not-for-profit hospitals compared to
11.2% public and 24.8% for-profit.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the continuous variables of operating
profit margin and total profit margin.
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables

Maximum

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Standard
Error

0.6407
0.6660

0.0591
0.0020

0.1111
0.1601

0.0011
0.0016

-0.0330

0.0105

-0.0016

0.0041

0.0000

0.0467

1.0000

0.4656

0.2846

0.0028

Variable
Minimum
Dependent Variables
Total Profit Margin
-0.6687
Operating Profit Margin
-1.1966
Independent Variables
VBP HRRP Combined Rate
Covariates
HHI
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The dependent variables have means of .002 and .059, respectively. Operating
margin and total profit margin are negatively skewed with operating margin more
negatively skewed than total profit margin.
Both variables have low standard errors, giving validity to the analysis and
representation of the population. The combined VBP/HRRP penalty rate has a positive
kurtosis with a highly negative skewness. The skewness is to be expected, as the
potential of -3% penalty for HRRP, and a standard -2% reduction for VBP, would lend
toward a negative skewness. The combined rate has a very low standard error and
standard deviation, making it representative of the population. HHI has a standard
curve, overall, with moderate skewness and kurtosis.
Missing data. Of the 3,571 hospital years that were excluded after rural
hospitals were removed, the majority of hospitals were located in states that had not
expanded Medicaid, consistent with the final population. Health system affiliation had
proportionally higher numbers in the excluded population than the final population, but
not at a significant level. Finally, the ownership structure was distributed similarly to the
final population. Upon review and analysis of the excluded population, there were no
groups excluded that would cause concern that the excluded hospitals would lead to
biased results, or indicate an issue with the study sampling methodology as shown in
Table 5.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Excluded Hospitals
Variable
Independent Variables
Covariates
Medicaid Expansion
Expanded
Not Expanded
Not Reported
Health System Affiliation
Affiliated
Not Affiliated
Not Reported
Ownership Structure
Public
For-Profit
Not-For-Profit
Not Reported

Number Proportion

815
1753
1003

22.8%
49.1%
28.1%

1167
745
1659

32.7%
20.9%
46.5%

200
579
1131
1659

5.6%
16.2%
31.7%
46.5%

Data outliers. Given the final study sample of 10,157 hospital years, the
variables of combined rate, total margin, operating margin, and HHI were analyzed for
outliers. An outlier was considered to be a variable that was more than 3 standard
deviations from its mean, either higher or lower, in line with JMP default analysis. Of the
total population there are 158 hospitals years for the combined rate, 171 for total
margin, 184 for operating margin, and none for HHI that were outside of three standard
deviations. There was a total of 447 hospital years (4.4% of the total sample) that were
affected, as several hospitals had outliers for more than one variable. Table 6 shows a
comparison of the distribution of variables compared to the total data set.
The statistical methods were run with and without these outlier observations to
test if they caused a change in the significance tests for hypothesis one and two. There
was no impact or change in the statistical results when these outliers were removed.
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Table 6
Outliers Compared to Final Population for Dichotomous Variables
Variables

Outliers
Count
%
56
13%
391
87%

Total Population
Count
%
991
10%
9166
90%

AHC

Yes
No

Year

2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

41
59
82
112
153

9%
13%
18%
25%
34%

2050
2251
2246
2247
1363

20%
22%
22%
22%
13%

HS
Affiliation

Yes
No

244
203

55%
45%

7185
2972

71%
29%

132
191
124

30%
43%
28%

2516
6503
1138

25%
64%
11%

For-Profit
Ownership
Structure Not-for-Profit
Public

These hospital years will be included in the study, as it was unclear if their outlier
values were due to true data anomalies or justified extreme values.
Statistics
To test both hypotheses, JMP Pro v.14 was used. A linear mixed model was
employed, and the hospitals were identified through their Medicare ID numbers and
were tracked on repetitions through the use of the dummy variable wave. A repeated
covariance type of autoregressive 1 was used as the data structure has homogeneous
variances and correlations that decline exponentially with distance. Using the
autoregressive function means that the two measurements (period/years) that are next
to each other (i.e. 2011 and 2012) in time series are correlated, and that correlation
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declines as the measurements get father apart (i.e. 2011 and 2014 have a lower
correlation). Statistical significance was based on a p-value of .05 for the study.
Hypothesis 1 Results
Hypothesis one is focused on the difference between AHCs and non-AHCs from
period 1, 2011 and 2012, and period 2, 2013 through 2015 on operating and total
margin. The models main effects were AHC and Period, with AHC by Period as the
factorial effect. The estimated marginal means of fitted models was run on the factor of
AHC by Period.
Period by operating margin. For the first analysis, the dependent variable was
operating margin with factors of period and AHC status. Table 7 shows the fixed effect
parameter estimates.
Table 7
Fixed Effects Parameter Estimates for Operating Margin by Period
Term
Intercept
AHC[0]
Period[1]
AHC[0]*Period[1]

Estimate
-0.020657
0.028512
0.003406
0.001659

Std Error
0.005036
0.005036
0.001657
0.001657

t Ratio
-4.10
5.66
2.06
1.00

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.0398*
0.3167

Table 7 shows that AHC status is significant with a p-value of less than .000. The
low p-value indicates that the status of a hospital as an AHC is significantly different
from that of non-AHCs on the dependent variable of operating margin. Period is also
statistically significant with a p-value of .04. However, the factorial component of AHC
by period is not significant. The result shows that while AHCs and non-AHCs are
different, and period 1 is different from period 2, the combined effect of AHC by period
was not significant for operating margin. Non-AHCs have an estimated operating margin
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that is .029 higher than the operating margin for AHCs, indicating that AHCs perform
worse on operating margin compared to non-AHCs. Period 1 also has a higher (.0034)
operating margin than period 2, indicating that period 1 has higher operating margins
than period 2. The estimated marginal means are plotted in Figure 4. Between period 1
and 2, non-AHCs had a drop of .01 for their operating margin means, while AHCs had a
drop of .004, neither of which was statistically significant.
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Figure 4. Least squares means plot for operating margin by period.
These results only partially support hypothesis one in that there is a significant
difference from period 1 to period 2, and there is a significant difference between AHCs
and non-AHCs. However, there was not a significant result when comparing the factorial
effect of AHC by period. This results suggests that the factorial effect of AHC and period
did not influence hospital operating margin, which does not support hypothesis one.
.

Period by total margin. For the second part of hypothesis one, the analysis

changed the dependent variable to total margin, with a factor of AHC status by period.
The results are show in table 8.
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Table 8
Fixed Effects Parameter Estimates for Total Margin by Period
Term
Intercept
AHC[0]
Period[1]
AHC[0]*Period[1]

Estimate
0.057844
-0.000742
-0.002760
0.001400

Std Error
0.003196
0.003196
0.001457
0.001457

t Ratio
18.10
-0.23
-1.89
0.96

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.8165
0.0582
0.3346

The most interesting result was the insignificance of the variable AHC. Compared
to Table 7, Table 8 shows the decrease in significance from .000 for operating margin,
to .817 for total margin. Period 1 to period 2 also lost significance, even though period
was close to the significant p-value of .05. AHC by period continued to be insignificant.
Figure 5 plots the estimated marginal means.
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Figure 5. Least squares means plot for total margin by period.
Non-AHCs increased .002 from period 1 to 2, along with AHCs increasing .009
from period 1 to period 2, however neither change was statistically significant. The
result indicates that the two types of hospitals did not experience a change over the two
study periods, not supporting hypothesis one that there would be a significant decline
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from period 1 to period 2. These analyses and the contradiction of hypothesis one on
total margin left some question as to the significance and importance of incorporating
period 1 and period 2 in the analysis, as opposed to year. To better understand and
analyze these results, period was substituted with year, and the analysis was performed
again following the same procedures as with period.
Year by operating margin. With the more detailed variable of year, AHC status,
and the factorial analysis of AHC by year, some variables achieved a significant p-value
under .05, as shown in Table 9.
Table 9
Fixed Effects Parameter Estimates for Operating Margin by Year
Term
Intercept
AHC[0]
Year[2012]
Year[2013]
Year[2014]
Year[2015]
AHC[0]*Year[2012]
AHC[0]*Year[2013]
AHC[0]*Year[2014]
AHC[0]*Year[2015]

Estimate
-0.022331
0.026860
0.002069
-0.004830
-0.006827
0.004097
-0.003106
-0.007605
0.001449
0.010203

Std Error
0.005080
0.005080
0.002558
0.002238
0.002579
0.003927
0.002558
0.002238
0.002579
0.003927

t Ratio
-4.40
5.29
0.81
-2.16
-2.65
1.04
-1.21
-3.40
0.56
2.60

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.4186
0.0310*
0.0081*
0.2968
0.2248
0.0007*
0.5743
0.0094*

As year replaces period, the AHC by year interaction becomes significant. This
significant interaction term indicates that AHCs and non-AHCs differ with regards to
operating margin, but the magnitude of the difference depends upon the year. Similarly,
the significant interaction term indicates that the years differ with regards to operating
margin, but the magnitude of the difference in years depends on the type of hospital you
are examining. The AHC by year interaction term p-values indicate that the
compression of the years into two periods was hiding some effects that are present in
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each year. With the expansion of years, it shows that there is a difference between the
two periods but it depends on the year. The result is not surprising as the variable of
year allows for more nuanced tracking of operating margin than just period 1 and 2.
The estimated marginal means tells more of the story of AHCs and non-AHCs over
the years than the first interaction of period with the first research question. Figure 6
shows the long-term performance of AHCs compared to non-AHCs.
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Figure 6. Least squares means plot for operating margin by year.
As shown in figure 6 and supported by the statistical analysis, AHCs did not have
a statistically significant change in their performance from 2011 through 2015. The
statically significant effect on the interaction terms was primarily due to the fluctuations
in performance for non-AHCs. Non-AHCs experienced the largest change from 2011
compared to 2013 and 2015 and were able to recover to their 2011 levels in 2015. The
result is in line with contingency theory and the concept that as the penalties are
implemented, non-AHCs will be impacted to a lesser degree and have the ability to
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change their organizations to minimize the impact of the changing contingencies,
compared to AHCs.
By including year, the analysis has provided a clearer picture of the financial
performance of AHCs and non-AHCs on operating margin over the 5 years of the study.
The more detailed analysis partially supports the hypothesis that AHCs are significantly
different in operating margins than non-AHCs. When year and AHC are factored the
analysis suggests that 2013 and 2015 were the only years where the combined effect
was significant also partially supporting hypothesis one.
Year by total margin. When applying the same analysis, trading period for
years, on total margin, the outcome of the analysis is different from the two period
analysis. Most significantly, the factorial analysis of AHC by year shifted from being
insignificant for periods with a p-value of .335 in Table 8, to being significant in 2013
with a p-value of .002 and in 2015 with a p-value of .001, as shown in Table 10.
Table 10
Fixed Effects Parameter Estimates for Total Margin by Year
Term
Intercept
AHC[0]
Year[2012]
Year[2013]
Year[2014]
Year[2015]
AHC[0]*Year[2012]
AHC[0]*Year[2013]
AHC[0]*Year[2014]
AHC[0]*Year[2015]

Estimate
0.058541
-0.001261
-0.001473
0.005469
0.000666
-0.004308
-0.001109
-0.006355
0.000209
0.010802

Std Error
0.003228
0.003228
0.002250
0.002031
0.002270
0.003337
0.002250
0.002031
0.002270
0.003337

t Ratio
18.13
-0.39
-0.65
2.69
0.29
-1.29
-0.49
-3.13
0.09
3.24

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.6961
0.5129
0.0071*
0.7690
0.1968
0.6224
0.0018*
0.9265
0.0012*

Again, as year replaces period, the AHC by year interaction becomes significant.
This significant interaction term indicates that AHCs and non-AHCs differ with regards
to total margin, but the magnitude of the difference depends upon the year. Similarly,
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the significant interaction term indicates that the years differ with regards to operating
margin, but the magnitude of the difference in years depends on the type of hospital you
are examining. Least square means (Figure 7) tell a much different story for AHCs and
non-AHCs, compared to period used before.
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Figure 7. Least squares means plot for total margin by year.
For non-AHCs, they show a statistically significant growth from 2013 to 2015 in
total margin, while AHCs had a spike in 2013 in total margin, followed by strong and
significant drops in 2014 and 2015 with a statically significant drop from 2011 through
2015. The sharp decline in total margin for AHCs is a noteworthy decline that may be
explained with additional variables to be analyzed in hypothesis two.
Hypothesis 2 Results
Hypothesis two expands on hypothesis one by including the HRRP and VBP
combined rates, along with control variables, and year. Following contingency theory,
the statistical methods will focus on the primary relationship between the independent
variables on operating and total margin. The analyses will also test the significance of
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the interactions of the independent variables (AHC by combined rate and AHC by year)
on operating and total margin to determine the influence of organizational fit.
Throughout this chapter, the estimated means are plotted to provide a visualization of
the interactions over the study period.
Combined rate by operating margin. Table 11 outlines the results from the
linear mixed model for fixed effects on operating margin.
Table 11
Fixed Effects Parameter Estimates for Linear Mixed Model and Operating Margin
with Combined Rate
Term
Intercept
AHC[0]
Year[2012]
Year[2013]
Year[2014]
Year[2015]
HSAffiliation[0]
HHI
MedicaidStatus[0]
OwnerStruc[Public]
OwnerStruc[FP]
Combined Rate
AHC[0]*Year[2012]
AHC[0]*Year[2013]
AHC[0]*Year[2014]
AHC[0]*Year[2015]
AHC[0]*Combined Rate

Estimate
-0.045960
0.011049
0.000293
-0.004180
-0.007440
0.006383
-0.010824
0.042208
-0.000863
-0.083944
0.073896
1.559110
-0.003005
-0.007932
0.001258
0.010354
0.063158

Std Error
0.006445
0.004905
0.002996
0.002473
0.002690
0.004155
0.002304
0.009129
0.001644
0.005195
0.004264
0.561913
0.002817
0.002424
0.002616
0.004047
0.560651

t Ratio
-7.13
2.25
0.10
-1.69
-2.76
1.54
-4.70
4.62
-0.52
-16.16
17.33
2.77
-1.07
-3.27
0.48
2.56
0.11

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.0244*
0.9220
0.0911
0.0057*
0.1245
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.5996
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.0055*
0.2862
0.0011*
0.6307
0.0105*
0.9103

Overall, when focusing on the primary variables of interest, the difference
between AHCs and non-AHCs was significant in the model with non-AHCs associated
with statistically higher operating margins in 2014 and 2015. Combined rate was also
significant, indicating that as the combined rate variable declines in its value the penalty
for a hospital is increasing. Conversely, a positive change in the combined rate variable
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(e.g., going from -1% to -0.5%) means that the penalty is decreasing. In table 11, the
estimate of 1.559 implies that as the penalty rate declines and potentially moves to a
bonus under VBP, profitability increases.
The interaction of combined rate by year was not performed due to the lack of
values (‘0’) in 2011 and 2012 since HRRP and VBP had not taken effect. If the factor of
year by combined rate would have been performed in JMP the lack of none zero values
for these two consecutive years would create a linear dependency on all of the
estimates leading to a lack of model fit when logistic regression is used.
AHC by combined rate was not significant indicating that while AHC and
combined rate are significant individually, the interaction of the two does not influence
operating margin. This result does not support hypothesis two that AHCs were more
significantly affected by increases in the HRRP/VBP penalty rate compared to nonAHCs.
HHI is significant, which is expected since the competitiveness of the hospital’s
market has been shown in prior research to impact hospital profitability (Wright, Tergas,
& Hou, 2016). Medicaid Status was not significant but that could be an indication of
many states not adopting it until 2014 and 2015 and each state adopting it in their own
unique way. This late adoption may have skewed the results with ‘0’ values for much of
2011 through 2013. Ownership structure was significant with public and not-for-profit
hospitals associated with lower operating margins compared to for-profit hospitals.
Health system affiliation is significant with hospitals being part of a health system
showing higher profitability.
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Figure 8 visualizes the estimated means for AHCs and non-AHCs and suggests
that AHC operating margins were more negatively trending from 2011 through 2014
compared to non-AHCs.
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Figure 8. Least squares means plot for operating margin and combined rate from
linear mixed model.
However, given the insignificance of the interaction of AHC and the combined
penalty rate, the implication is that differential effects of HRRP/VBP penalties on AHCs
versus non-AHCs are not the explanation for this divergence in operating margins
across these two types of hospitals.
These results do not support hypothesis two for operating margin. While the
combined rate of HRRP and VBP and AHC status are significant as are certain years,
the interactions of these key variables indicate that something else in the environment is
leading to the lower operating margin for AHCs from 2011 through 2015.
Combined rate by total margin. The second part of hypotheses two performed the

same analysis, with the same variables, but with a dependent variable of total margin.
Table 12 outlines the fixed effects parameter estimates. AHC continues to be significant
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individually but it depends on the year. Non-AHCs are associated with lower total
margin, a change from operating margin. Combined rate is no longer significant at
p=.05 but with a p-value of .0601 this may not be an ignorable effect.
Table 12
Fixed Effects Parameter Estimates for Linear Mixed Model and Total Margin .
..with Combined Rate
Term
Intercept
AHC[0]
Year[2012]
Year[2013]
Year[2014]
Year[2015]
HSAffiliation[0]
HHI
MedicaidStatus[0]
OwnerStruc[Public]
OwnerStruc[FP]
Combined Rate
AHC[0]*Year[2012]
AHC[0]*Year[2013]
AHC[0]*Year[2014]
AHC[0]*Year[2015]
AHC[0]*Combined Rate

Estimate
0.054489
-0.006828
-0.003183
0.005858
0.000625
-0.001775
-0.003220
0.013305
0.000372
-0.031927
0.034125
0.911120
-0.002387
-0.005923
0.000358
0.012578
0.748900

Std Error
0.0044387
0.0033475
0.0026139
0.0022200
0.0023631
0.0035325
0.0017376
0.0062927
0.0014121
0.0037285
0.0030297
0.4846283
0.0024651
0.0021791
0.0023004
0.0034430
0.4834479

t Ratio
12.28
-2.04
-1.22
2.64
0.26
-0.50
-1.85
2.11
0.26
-8.56
11.26
1.88
-0.97
-2.72
0.16
3.65
1.55

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.0415*
0.2233
0.0083*
0.7914
0.6154
0.0639
0.0346*
0.7921
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.0601
0.3329
0.0066*
0.8761
0.0003*
0.1214

AHC by year is again significant for individual years, 2013 and 2015, as it was with
operating margin. AHC by combined rate is not significant, continuing the findings from
operating margin.
Health system affiliation changes relative to findings for operating margin,
becoming insignificant for total margin with a p-value of .063. HHI and ownership
structure continue to be significant as with operating margin. Medicaid status continues
to be insignificant.
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AHC estimated margin means presented in Figure 9, provides insights on the
trends in total margin for AHCs and non-AHCs.
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Figure 9. Least squares means plot for total margin and combined rate from
linear mixed model.
While AHCs had sustained higher total margins than non-AHCs from 2011
through 2014, total margin experienced a decline from 2013 through 2015 similar to
operating margin. Non-AHCs showed a better ability to maintain and increase total
margin over that time, surpassing AHCs in 2015 for total margin. As with operating
margin, hypothesis two is not supported in that HRRP and VBP had no differential
influence on AHC’s total margin when compared to non-AHCs. The results suggest that
something in the environment is affecting the trends for AHCs and non-AHCs but it is
unclear from this analysis what that may be.
Supplementary Analysis
In addition to the analysis for hypothesis one and two, a separate supplementary
analysis was performed to review the individual impact of HRRP and VBP, using the
same parameters as hypotheses two.
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VBP by operating margin. Table 13 outlines the fixed effects parameter
estimates using the linear mixed model with VBP instead of the combined rate on
operating margin.
Table 13
Fixed Effects Parameter Estimates for Linear Mixed Model and
…..Operating Margin with VBP
Term
Intercept
AHC[0]
Year[2012]
Year[2013]
Year[2014]
Year[2015]
HSAffiliation[0]
HHI
MedicaidStatus[0]
OwnerStruc[Public]
OwnerStruc[FP]
VBP
AHC[0]*Year[2012]
AHC[0]*Year[2013]
AHC[0]*Year[2014]
AHC[0]*Year[2015]
AHC[0]*VBP

Estimate
-0.048293
0.010777
0.003296
-0.005920
-0.008175
0.002889
-0.010669
0.041817
-0.001106
-0.083281
0.073418
4.037350
-0.002616
-0.007793
0.000710
0.009989
-0.221280

Std Error
0.006311
0.004749
0.002786
0.002322
0.002671
0.004025
0.002300
0.009107
0.001642
0.005187
0.004256
0.998087
0.002563
0.002260
0.002591
0.003894
0.997608

t Ratio
-7.65
2.27
1.18
-2.55
-3.06
0.72
-4.64
4.59
-0.67
-16.05
17.25
4.05
-1.02
-3.45
0.27
2.57
-0.22

.

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.0234*
0.2369
0.0108*
0.0022*
0.4730
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.5005
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.3076
0.0006*
0.7841
0.0103*
0.8245

As with hypothesis two, health system affiliation, HHI, and the ownership
structure are still significant. VBP is significant on its own with a p-value of less than .05.
The positive estimate indicated that as VBP becomes more positive (i.e., as the VBP
penalty declines) hospitals see a positive change in operating margin. AHC by VBP is
insignificant with a p-value of .8 following the same trend shown in hypothesis two on
operating margin. Figure 10 plots the least squares means by year comparing AHC and
non-AHCs. Figure 10, when compared to Figure 8, shows a similar trend for both AHCs
and non-AHCs.
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Figure 10. Least squares means plot for operating margin and VBP from .
………..linear mixed model.
The trend over the years shows a steady decline for both types from 2011 through
2013, followed by an improvement in 2014 and 2015 for non-AHCs, and only a slight
improvement for AHCs from 2014 to 2015. The results indicate that VBP on its own
does not have a significantly different result than VBP and HRRP combined when
compared to operating margin from 2011 through 2015.
VBP by total margin. Similar to operating margin, the trend continues with total

margin. Table 14 outlines the fixed effects parameter estimates with total margin and
VBP. AHC was again significant in the fixed effects with the other variables of HHI and
ownership status, and a marginal significant for health system affiliation, when
compared to Table 12. Medicaid status along with all years except 2013 were
insignificant, as was the case with the combined rate analysis (Table 12). Year by AHC
for years 2012 and 2014 were also insignificant which repeated the findings from the
combined rate analysis. The most interesting result was with VBP becoming significant
when isolated from HRRP. AHC by VBP was not significant at .8.
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Table 14
Fixed Effects Parameter Estimates for Linear Mixed Model and
Total Margin with VBP
Term
Intercept
AHC[0]
Year[2012]
Year[2013]
Year[2014]
Year[2015]
HSAffiliation[0]
HHI
MedicaidStatus[0]
OwnerStruc[Public]
OwnerStruc[FP]
VBP
AHC[0]*Year[2012]
AHC[0]*Year[2013]
AHC[0]*Year[2014]
AHC[0]*Year[2015]
AHC[0]*VBP

Estimate
0.053411
-0.008412
-0.001527
0.005182
0.000356
-0.004080
-0.003015
0.012945
0.000204
-0.031152
0.033528
3.214288
-0.000676
-0.006765
-0.000528
0.010869
0.163224

Std Error
0.004305
0.003190
0.002438
0.002093
0.002346
0.003426
0.001736
0.006287
0.001410
0.003729
0.003029
0.853030
0.002252
0.002041
0.002277
0.003317
0.852248

t Ratio
12.40
-2.64
-0.63
2.48
0.15
-1.19
-1.74
2.06
0.15
-8.35
11.07
3.77
-0.30
-3.31
-0.23
3.28
0.19

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.0084*
0.5311
0.0133*
0.8792
0.2339
0.0825
0.0396*
0.8846
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.0002*
0.7642
0.0009*
0.8166
0.0011*
0.8481

These results still do not support hypothesis 2 but do show that VBP is more significant
for the total margin analysis when examined independently from the combined rate.
Figure 11, a plot of the least squares means, does show the difference between AHCs
and non-AHCs with AHCs dropping below non-AHCs in 2015. This result is consistent
with Figure 9 in hypothesis two.
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Figure 11. Least squares means plot for total margin and VBP from linear mixed
model.
HRRP by operating margin. The supplemental analysis continues the review
with an analysis of HRRP with the same variables as combined rate in hypothesis two.
Table 15 provides the fixed effects of the parameter estimates for HRRP on operating
margin. The only difference in the HRRP supplementary analysis compared to the VBP
analysis was the insignificance of HRRP as compared to VBP. In the first supplemental
analysis, VBP was significant with a p-value of <.01, as was the combined rate,
whereas HRRP had an insignificant p-value of .5. This indicates that VBP is more
significant in predicting hospital operating margin than was HRRP from 2011 through
2015. However, as with VPB and combined rate, HRRP by AHC continues to be
insignificant, not supporting hypothesis two. Figure 12 provides the least squares
means plot for AHC by operating margin.
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Table 15
Fixed Effects Parameter Estimates for Linear Mixed Model and
Operating Margin with HRRP
Term
Intercept
AHC[0]
Year[2012]
Year[2013]
Year[2014]
Year[2015]
HSAffiliation[0]
HHI
MedicaidStatus[0]
OwnerStruc[Public]
OwnerStruc[FP]
HRRP
AHC[0]*Year[2012]
AHC[0]*Year[2013]
AHC[0]*Year[2014]
AHC[0]*Year[2015]
AHC[0]*HRRP

Estimate
-0.048454
0.011581
0.001917
-0.005127
-0.007632
0.004246
-0.010700
0.042210
6.339e-6
-0.084253
0.074128
0.457204
-0.003532
-0.007035
0.001790
0.010006
0.2625336

Std Error
0.006493
0.004964
0.003063
0.002510
0.002680
0.004235
0.002310
0.009167
0.001637
0.005212
0.004279
0.691172
0.002891
0.002464
0.002607
0.004128
0.6901722

t Ratio
-7.46
2.33
0.63
-2.04
-2.85
1.00
-4.63
4.60
0.00
-16.16
17.32
0.66
-1.22
-2.85
0.69
2.42
0.38

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.0197*
0.5314
0.0412*
0.0044*
0.3161
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.9969
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.5083
0.2219
0.0043*
0.4922
0.0154*
0.7037

Figure 12 is consistent with the previous plots for VBP and combined rate on
operating margin and indicate that HRRP on its own does not provide any other
conclusions than what were provided in the initial analysis.
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Figure 12. Least squares means plot for operating margin and HRRP from linear
mixed model.
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HRRP by total margin. Table 16 provides the fixed effects parameter estimates
for HRRP on total margin.
Table 16
Fixed Effects Parameter Estimates for Linear Mixed Model and
Total Margin with HRRP
Term
Intercept
AHC[0]
Year[2012]
Year[2013]
Year[2014]
Year[2015]
HSAffiliation[0]
HHI
MedicaidStatus[0]
OwnerStruc[Public]
OwnerStruc[FP]
HRRP
AHC[0]*Year[2012]
AHC[0]*Year[2013]
AHC[0]*Year[2014]
AHC[0]*Year[2015]
AHC[0]*HRRP

Estimate
0.052142
-0.006144
-0.001725
0.004971
0.000598
-0.003794
-0.003165
0.013427
0.001213
-0.032367
0.034512
-0.156420
-0.003137
-0.004940
0.000810
0.012653
1.124576

Std Error
0.004487
0.003410
0.002672
0.002250
0.002353
0.003603
0.001745
0.006331
0.001406
0.003747
0.003045
0.597815
0.002528
0.002212
0.002291
0.003514
0.596936

t Ratio
11.62
-1.80
-0.65
2.21
0.25
-1.05
-1.81
2.12
0.86
-8.64
11.33
-0.26
-1.24
-2.23
0.35
3.60
1.88

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.0718
0.5185
0.0272*
0.7993
0.2924
0.0698
0.0340*
0.3882
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.7936
0.2148
0.0256*
0.7235
0.0003*
0.0596

The result indicates that VBP is more significant than HRRP when evaluating the
programs impact on hospital total margin. Interestingly, AHC is also insignificant, a
departure from the VBP findings and hypothesis two results indicating that the analysis
of HRRP and AHCs are further not correlated to total margin performance compared to
VBP and their combined effect. However, AHC by HRRP indicates a marginal
significance and may indicate that HRRP affects AHCs marginally differently than nonAHCs. Figure 13 plots the least squares means and again shows no significant
departure from hypothesis two.
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Figure 13. Least squares means plot for total margin and HRRP from linear
mixed model.
Chapter Summary
The study analyzed the difference between AHCs and non-AHCs in their
operating and total margins, and investigated the impact that HRRP and VBP had on
these two hospital types from 2011 through 2015. Contingency theory provided a
framework and suggested that differences in performance would be present across
these hospital types, and that HRRP/VBP penalties would have a differentially greater
impact on profitability of AHCs than non-AHCs. The central theme of the study, obtained
through contingency theory, was that as contingencies changed AHCs would have a
more difficult time adjusting their organizational structure to respond to these
government programs.
The chapter investigated these propositions through the measurement of fit,
specifically the dependent variables of operating and total margin. It focused on the
contingencies of AHC and non-AHC and the introduction of HRRP and VBP, while
following previous research and controlling for other variables. The chapter presented
the data, how that data was organized, and how the final data set was filtered to
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produce the dataset used. Summary statistics were presented and outliers were
reviewed for patterns and significance.
A linear mixed model in JMP was used to evaluate the two hypotheses, along
with supplemental analysis. The results showed that AHCs and non-AHCs had
significantly different profit margins over time, and that the combined penalties of VBP
and HRRP had a significant impact on operating and total margins. Overall though, the
findings suggested that HRRP/VBP penalties had a similar effect on operating margins
of both AHCs and non-AHCs. Through supplemental analyses, it was also found that
VBP had a larger impact on total and operating margin compared to HRRP. The overall
results of these analyses provides partial support for hypothesis one of the study, but no
support for hypothesis two.

102

Chapter 6: Conclusions
This chapter opens with a discussion of the study’s findings. Then, the results are
discussed in context of the two hypotheses. The implications of the study are outlined,
with focus on the managerial and policy impacts. This is followed by a review and
commentary of contingency theory in relation to the study. The study limitations are
discussed, along with the suggestions for future research. The chapter concludes with a
review of the materials presented.
Summary and Overview
AHCs differ from non-AHCs in many fundamental ways, primarily stemming from
AHCs’ tripartite mission focusing on education, research, and practice. As outlined in
Chapter 2, these differences led to different organizational structures that are
dependent on government payers, high patient populations enrolled in Medicare and
Medicaid, and high costs related to education and research, when compared to nonAHCs. AHCs’ unique organizational structures potentially leaves them vulnerable to
changes in payment structures and government programs.
The purpose of the study was to investigate how these organizational structures
interacted with two government programs, HRRP and VBP, potentially causing
differences in operating and total margins of AHCs when compared to non-AHCs, from
2011 through 2015. This was investigated through two research questions, the first
primarily examining differences, over time, of AHCs versus non-AHCs, at a descriptive
level, and the second examining if and how HRRP and VBP affected operating and total
margin for these two hospital groups, when controlling for other environmental and
hospital characteristics. These research questions were evaluated based on a
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contingency theory framework. The framework proposes a link between contingencies
(HRRP, VBP, and AHC status), leading to a change in fit, as measured by operating
and total margins.
Contingency theory was selected for the underlying theory, as it provides a
framework to explain how changes in environmental factors can lead to reduced
performance. The theory hypothesizes that over time, an organization’s contingencies
will change. As they change, organizations must adjust their structures to best meet
these new contingencies to prevent a loss of market fit, leading to a decline in their
performance. While the study’s results, summarized in Chapter 5, show differences
between AHCs with some varying effects from the variables in the study, the research
hypotheses for both questions are not fully supported. The remainder of this chapter will
focus on putting into context the implications of study findings for AHCs and non-AHCs
and their profitability.
Discussion of the Study Findings
Hypothesis 1. AHCs will have a statistically different operating and total
margins compared to non-AHCs before (period 1) the implementation of HRRP
and VBP and after (period 2).
Hypothesis one focused on the overall question: is there a difference between
the profitability of AHCs, compared to non-AHCs, and how did they perform from period
one to period two. Hypothesis one was an important question, as research to date had
not investigated if there was actually a financial difference between AHCs, and only
alluded that circumstances should lead to a difference in financial performance. Upon
evaluation of hypothesis one first looking at operating margin, the results showed that
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that there was a difference between AHCs and non-AHCs with non-AHCs having a
higher operating margin, and that both AHCs and non-AHCs had higher operating
margins in period one when compared to period two. However, the interaction of AHC
by period was not significant. This finding did not support hypothesis one that there was
a significant difference between the two periods dependent on AHC status. The result of
the analysis for the first part of hypothesis one was only partially supported in that AHCs
had lower operating margins, compared to non-AHCs, and both hospital types being
negatively affected from period 1 to period 2.
Hypothesis one was then investigated on total margin. The results did not
support the second part of hypothesis one, as there was no difference in period, AHC,
or the interaction effect. This result was not expected, as there was at least an
expectation that there would be a difference in AHC and non-AHC for total margin, even
if there was not a difference from period 1 and period 2. The significance of the values
for period, .058, under a p-value of .1, indicating there was a marginal effect, which led
to the question of whether the use of year-by-year indicators rather than a simple period
indicator was more appropriate for examining changing margins over time. The
inference was that a period indicator was masking a significant interaction that was
happening in the individual years. To investigate this idea, hypothesis one was reevaluated by expanding the two periods into individual year indicators.
By performing tests by years on operating and total margins again, the findings
for hypothesis one changed. For both margins, the interaction of year by AHC became
significant for specific years, meaning that the AHC designation is significant but it
depends on the year, and the year is significant depending on the AHC designation. On
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operating margin, there was not statistically significant change for AHCs from 2011 to
2015 and much of the variation was driven by non-AHCs on the five-year period. For
total margin AHCs experienced a statistically significant change in 2013 and then a
decline from 2013 to 2015. Non-AHCs experienced a statistically significant gain from
2011 to 2015. Interestingly, for operating margin, 2013 referenced against 2011 resulted
in non-AHCs having a more significant decline than AHCs but this trend was reversed in
2015 with non-AHCs regaining their 2011 operating margin levels. Again, these results
only partially supported hypothesis one for the select years.
The result was represented visually in Figures 6 and 7. In Figure 6, AHCs no
change in their operating margins, where non-AHCs experienced a decline, followed by
a rebound in 2015 to their original 2011 operating levels. The interesting change from
period to year becomes more evident on total margin, as represented in Figure 7.
Figure 7 shows AHCs outperforming non-AHCs in 2011 and 2012, followed by a large
increase in 2013, then a steep decrease in 2014 and 2015. The pattern of increases
and decreases were different from what was observed for operating margin, suggesting
there were non-operating revenue or expense streams causing this fluctuation that only
impacted AHCs. The finding is an interesting result, with the cause not being evident
with the available data.
By changing from period to year, the results from both tests only partially support
hypothesis one. AHCs were only significantly different for operating margin and it was
only a significant difference in 2013 and 2015 when AHC status was interacted with
year primarily related to non-AHC performance in those years. For total margin, only
AHC status by 2013 and 2015 were significant but with 2013 showing a higher margin
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for AHCs. As noted, these results do not fully support hypothesis one and only partially
support the expectations that were drawn from contingency theory. There may be other
organizational or environmental factors that caused AHCs to have a different financial
path compared to non-AHCs.
The results from hypothesis one contribute to the literature by providing a
detailed analyses of the difference between AHCs and non-AHCs on performance,
measured by operating and total margins at a descriptive level. The partial support of
hypothesis one calls into question statements made by those who have suggested
financial performance differences would be evident due to AHCs high costs and
obligations (AAMC, 2018c; Grover, Slavin, & Willson, 2014; Koenig et al., 2003; Thier,
2001). Hypothesis two results further explored these relationships by incorporating
additional variables in the analysis.
Hypothesis 2. AHCs will experience a larger negative impact on their
operating and total margins after the implementation of HRRP and VBP when
compared to non-AHCs.
Hypothesis two focused on expanding hypothesis one, through the inclusion of
additional independent variables of combined rate (the net effect of HRRP penalties and
VBP bonuses or penalties) AHC status, and year, along with various control variables
that have been identified by previous research as strong predictors of hospital
profitability. As opposed to hypothesis one, hypothesis two used year as a variable from
the beginning, and not period. Hypothesis two was also based on contingency theory
and expands on its use from hypothesis one through the inclusion of combined rate and
AHC status, which are the primary contingencies of interest in this study, in an analysis
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of operating and total margins. Hypothesis two focused on the interactions between
year by AHC status and combined rate by AHC status.
The first part of hypothesis two measured the variables against operating margin.
The most relevant result was AHC by year, showing that AHC status was only
significant when evaluated for 2013 and 2015, a similar result from hypothesis one. This
result along with the combined rate by AHC being insignificant did not support
hypothesis two. Even though the interactions were not significant, the result for
combined rate on its own does partially support previous research that had shown
HRRP and VBP being significant factors affecting operating performance (Gu et al.,
2014; Rice, 2015) with the variable combined rate being significant at a p= .0055. When
plotting the least squared means for operating margin and year in Figure 8, it does show
that there is a separate trend for AHCs and non-AHCs in the out years for 2014 and
2015. The figure and results from the first part of hypothesis two indicate that there may
be organizational and environmental factors affecting these two hospital types but not
the primary contingencies that this research question focused on.
In the next step, combined rate by total margin, showed a similar outcome to
operating margin and combined rate with the years 2013 and 2015 being significant,
although combined rate was insignificant with a p-value of less than .1. The result is not
unexpected since total margin includes more funding sources to offset variations in
operating performance. In this case, the other funding sources are able to offset
potential financial performance reductions due to HRRP and VBP penalties. AHC status
was still significant but again it depended on the years and it was insignificant when
paired with the combined rate. Figure 9 shows AHCs performance increasing for 2013
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but then sharply declining over time while non-AHCs show a steady growth in total
margin over time. However, with insignificant results for the interactions these results
again do not support hypothesis two and indicate that there may be some factors
affecting profitability other than the contingencies investigated.
The other variables, with the exception of Medicaid expansion status and health
system affiliation, were all significant. It is interesting that health system affiliation was
insignificant, when it was significant with operating margin. This may be related to a
hospital’s ability to generate other funding. Under the total margin calculation, items
such as contributions and donations, income from investments, and income from other
services (such as food or rental of space) are captured, as opposed to operating
margin. These additional revenues could rise to such a level that it offsets some of the
financial benefits that are obtained through hospital affiliation. Hospital affiliation would
primarily benefit patient revenues (through more favorably negotiated insurance
contracts) and expenses (through reduced prices for goods and services), so the
significance of the finding only for operating margin may not be uncharacteristic.
Hypothesis two’s results support previous research that found HRRP and VBP
had significant associations with hospital operating margin, but these studies typically
also found that these programs had a significant correlation with total margin as well
(Bazzoli, Thompson, & Waters, 2018; Gilman et al., 2015; Kahn et al., 2015). This
study’s findings may differ from others study’s due to the use of different years and
variations of variables of interest with this study focusing on AHCs.
Additionally, while other research has shown the importance of Medicaid
expansion, this study found that it was not significant in any of the results. This was an
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interesting result as previous research (Chen et al., 2017) has shown that the Medicaid
expansion resulting from the Affordable Care Act was a significant factor when
comparing operating margins for hospitals in states that had expanded Medicaid
compared to those that had not in the Mississippi Delta region. The result of the
analysis in Chapter 5 led to an interesting conclusion that Medicaid expansion is either
not influential on operating and total margins or the measurement of the variable
‘Medicaid expansion’ coded as a 0/1 dichotomous variable failed to capture the
intricacies that are evident in each state’s individual circumstances as they expanded
Medicaid. This is an opportunity for future research to understand what factors led to
this result and how it conflicted with other studies.
Supplemental analysis for VBP and HRRP. The supplemental analysis
focused on the importance of VBP and HRRP, individually, on operating and total
margin.
VBP was analyzed first with the same variables on operating margin as
hypothesis two. The findings showed that the significance levels of study variables were
consistent in the models that used VBP only when compared to the model with the
combined HRRP/VBP rate. For total margin, VBP was found to be significant on its own
with a p-value of .0002, a departure from combined rate which had a p-value of .06.
This may be due to the implementation of VBP occurring fully in 2013 without the same
staging process that HRRP used.
As a strong departure from VBP, HRRP was insignificant for both operating and
total margins when examined on its own. However, the interaction of HRRP and AHC
had a p-value of .059 for total margin, which was under .1, indicating marginal
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significance. The result is interesting as all other analyses have showed declining
significance in the combined rate from the operating margin analysis (p-value.0055) to
the total margin analysis (p-value .0601) and no other result showed a significant
interaction between AHC and either the combined rate or the VBP.
The results of the supplementary analysis show that VBP had more of an impact
on profitability when contrasted to HRRP with HRRP only showing a marginal
significance when taken into account with AHC for total margin. Overall, the results
continued to not support hypothesis two.
Review of the results. Based on the results from this study’s analyses,
hypothesis one is only partially supported and hypotheses two is not supported. The
study has shown that the combined rate of HRRP and VBP and AHC status,
individually, are important for operating and total margins but the interaction of HRRP
and VBP with AHC status and year are not consistently significant. The results do
support previous research that has shown other factors, such as hospital ownership
status and HHI, are significant in determining a hospital’s profitability from 2011 through
2015, with the exception of the Medicaid expansion variable. The results suggest that
other organizational and environmental factors may be leading to differences in AHC
versus non-AHC financial performance.
Managerial and Policy Implications of the Study
The findings of this study have managerial and policy implications. Each of these
implications will be discussed briefly.
For leaders of all hospitals subject to HRRP and VBP, the biggest implication is
that HRRP and VBP do impact their profitability, mainly operating margin. The results of
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the study demonstrate that hospitals that are able to minimize HRRP penalties and
maximize VBP bonuses can benefit financially. Another implication of this research is
that HRRP and VBP are not equal when it comes to their impacts on operating and total
margins. From the design of the two programs and based upon this study’s findings, it is
generalizable that the average hospital would benefit from working with the VBP
program, maximizing their financial gain in comparison to HRRP. If a hospital has
limited resources to address both programs to improve rates and outcomes, hospital
leadership could be better off focusing on VBP. Leadership may also find that VBP is a
much more flexible program, allowing hospitals to select metrics and compare their
performance against either peer hospitals or their previous historical performance. For
the hospital leader, this can take the form of eliminating or reducing adverse events,
adopting evidence-based care standards, and/or changing the patients' care
experiences for the better. The options are much more plentiful compared to HRRP and
can be implemented at varying levels, allowing hospital leaders to tailor strategies that
fit their current situations. HRRP does not afford the same benefits, as this program is a
comparable program but penalizes hospitals specifically based upon their readmission
rates.
An interesting implication of this study is that Medicaid expansion was not a
significant factor affecting a hospital’s margin. In many states that have yet to expand
Medicaid, this may be a point of debate with state governments. Even if a state expands
Medicaid, it does not necessarily translate to higher financial margins for hospitals.
These findings may be the product of a loss of other supplemental operating funding as
Medicaid is expanded. State governments may be reducing supplemental funding to
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hospitals with the expectation hospitals will receive insurance payments that otherwise
would not have existed prior to Medicaid expansion. With the effect of Medicaid
expansion on profitability being unclear, governments should be cautious to remove
other funding sources without understanding how Medicaid expansion affects AHCs and
other high Medicaid population hospitals. Hospital management and policy makers
should take all of these factors into account when addressing AHC funding.
The most important policy implication that this study addressed is that AHCs are
different when it comes to operating and total margins. While this varies by year and is
not related to HRRP and VBP, the results suggest that there are other factors that may
be leading to AHCs being uniquely impacted when it comes to operating and total
margins. Many view AHCs as a vulnerable group of hospitals, different from non-AHCs,
and future policies should take this into consideration, perhaps providing more time for
them to adjust to changing practices and policies.
Comments on Contingency Theory
Contingency theory was developed to explain why organizations are structured in
certain ways, and how those organizations' structures will change to meet shifting
contingencies and maintain a high level of fit in their environment. In this study,
contingency theory was employed to explain how HRRP and VBP could affect fit of
hospitals, as measured by total and operating margins, from 2011 through 2015, and
explain why some hospitals would perform better over that time than others. The main
contingencies of AHC status and combined HRRP and VBP rate were used, along with
covariates of competitiveness, health system affiliation, Medicaid expansion, and
ownership structure. While the study did not support the ways that HRRP and VBP were
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hypothesized to impact AHCs over time, there were instances of year by AHC being
significant and the study did show that AHCs were different from non-AHCs
independently from other control variables.
Based on this study’s use of contingency theory, it was hypothesized that as a
hospital’s environment changes, and its contingencies change, this would lead to a
differential effect for AHCs when compared to non-AHCs. The results shown in Figures
8 and 9, plotting least squared means, were the most supportive of contingency theory
showing that the performance of the two hospital groups did diverge from 2013 through
2015. However, the study failed to demonstrate that the two specific contingencies
under study (i.e., AHC status and the HRRP and VBP programs) might be the cause of
this divergence.
One lesson that was learned from the use of contingency theory in this study is
that it is important to incorporate data on organizational structures that may lead to
improved fit and measures of prior performance. This study did incorporate the prior
performance measures, which was noted by Donaldson (1995) as being a key issue in
that many prior studies failed to incorporate this into their analysis. By including prior
performance, this study was able to control for multiple determinants of performance
that may not have been directly observed otherwise.
However, since this study focused primarily on the difference in financial
performance over time it did not have, and thus, did not include, variables that would
lead to the explanation of how, or what, changed within the structures of the
organizations. This limitation of excluding key variables is another criticism of
Donaldson (2001). A recommendation to cope with this common issue is to
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development of a composite measure of fit in contingency theory studies. Although this
study attempted to assess fit for each contingent pairing individually, a composite
measure of fit is more likely to explain differences in organizational performance (Drazin
& Van de Ven, 1985). As mentioned earlier, the addition of composite measure might
be more appropriate for future research to better understand how organizations
responded to changes in contingencies.
Study Limitations
Missing data was the largest limitation in the study. As outlined in Chapter 4,
reductions in the overall study sample were required due to missing structural data,
along with missing financial data. This is a limitation that other studies have
encountered, and will continue to encounter, unless the submission and review of data
are addressed at CMS and American Hospital Association. This study is confident in its
use and analysis of the available data, even with the missing data, as other research
has used these data and they are recognized across this type of research as acceptable
data sources. A disproportionate amount of missing data in 2015 is a concern, but was
expected, as data are still being collected and approved in CMS. Future research
should include more complete 2015, data and additional years, to understand if the
trends, overall, are in fact trends, or products of missing data.
Another potential limitation of this study is measurement error in the reporting of
study variables. This should have a minimum impact on the study data since there were
a significant number of variables, and one of the key variables under study was based
on a simple classification structure of group membership (i.e., hospital AHC status) with

115

minimum potential impact of incorrect data being reported. Additionally, the results, with
the exception of Medicaid expansion, are in line with what other studies have found.
A limitation that was addressed in the additional analysis of hypothesis one was
the use of a simple indicator for period 1 versus period 2 for the HRRP/VBP analysis.
This limitation generated misleading results that did not tell the whole story when
comparing AHCs to non-AHCs over the two periods. The additional analysis using year
indicators provided more insight into the performance of AHCs over the study period,
and resolved this limitation, along with analysis used for assessing hypothesis two.
Suggestions for Future Research
The most important suggestion for future research is to better understand what
organizational changes lead to differential hospital financial performance over time. The
assumption was made, based on contingency theory, that if the margins improved,
organizational structures must have changed, as the primary contingencies of interest
(i.e., AHC status) did not change. There is a large opportunity, and the potential for
qualitative and quantitative analysis to understand why some hospitals improved, while
others did not. As mentioned above, composite measures of fit have been used in other
research to examine changes in an organization. The incorporation of a composite
measure could help to further understand what caused the two different financial paths
of these hospitals. A composite measure could be developed to include other
characteristics that might have changed, such as leadership, quality improvement
initiatives, or other institutional and environmental changes.
Outside of contingency theory, this study failed to identify the key variables that
lead to variations between AHC and non-AHC operating and total margins. A data book
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produced by MedPAC (2018) showed similar findings between teaching and nonteaching hospitals with major teaching hospitals showing a downward trend after 2013
through 2016 compared to non-teaching hospitals on total all-payer margin. The data
book did not provide an explanation for these differences in performance. Any
suggestion as to the cause of these differences would be speculative in nature at this
point, other than high-level causes such as the Affordable Care Act and/or improvement
in the overall economy. A key activity for future research would be to break down
financial margins into their component parts to better understand the trends over time.
Financial margins combine revenue and expense performance, but as an aggregated
measure, do not allow one to understand how these two components are changing
relative to one another. The difference in performance for AHCs might lie with expense
performance (AHCs being less able to control costs relative to non-AHCs) or revenue
performance (non-AHCs being more able to generate revenues relative to AHCs).
Exploring trends in revenues and expenses for AHCs and non-AHCs would be the next
logical step in trying to determine why these hospital organizations had differential
financial paths over the period of study.
Future research should also determine what happened to total margin in 2013 for
AHCs (Figure 9). AHCs saw a significant spike but there did not seem to be a
contributing factor that explained that spike. There are opportunities to investigate the
AHCs that experienced this type of financial improvement to further research the cause
for the change and the cause for the steep decline in 2014 and 2015.
Finally, the results of the study found contradicting results when applying
Medicaid expansion as a variable. Other research, namely Chen et al. (2017), has
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found Medicaid expansion to have a significant effect on hospital profitability, but under
each analysis and supplementary analyses in the study, Medicaid expansion continued
to be insignificant. Future research could expand on this concept, especially looking at
the extent of Medicaid enrollment increases in different states to better understand the
influence of Medicaid expansion on hospital operating and total margins.
Conclusions
The study was designed to investigate the difference between AHC and nonAHC profitability, as measured by operating and total margins, from 2011 through 2015,
during the implementation of HRRP and VBP. The study proposed two main
hypotheses: 1) that there would be a difference between AHCs and non-AHCs from
period 1 (pre-HRRP and VBP) and period 2 (post-HRRP and VBP), and 2) that there
would be a differential effect on financial margins between AHC and non-AHCs from
2011 through 2015, related directly to the combined rate of HRRP and VBP, while
controlling for other variables. The results of the study only partially supported
hypothesis one when the period indicator was replaced by yearly indicators, showing
that there was a difference in profitability only in 2013 and 2015 between AHCs and
non-AHCs. The second hypothesis was not supported when evaluating hospitals on
AHC status and the combined rate. For both operating and total margins, AHCs were
not impacted differentially from non-AHCs on combined rate and only differed in 2013
and 2015 on both operating and total margins. These results suggest that there is
something else affecting AHC profitability other than differential effects from HRRP and
VBP penalties. The supplemental analysis showed that VBP had significant impacts on
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operating and total margins, while HRRP was only marginally significant when factored
with AHC for total margin.
The results have both managerial and policy implications. The managerial
implications are important for hospital leadership, showing that HRRP and VBP are
important factors when understanding their operating and total margins. Other
managerial implications were that Medicaid expansion did not appear to be correlated
with higher margins. Prior to state governments reducing subsidies for hospitals that
serve low income or indigent populations, they should review the effect Medicaid
expansion has had on hospital profitability.
The study did have some limitations that are prevalent in this type of research,
such as missing data and outliers. The study spent considerable time reviewing the
missing and outlier data characteristics, and concluded that the final sample was
representative of the total group of hospitals of interest to the study. The large sample
size allows for the generalizability of the study for this study’s results to urban US based
hospitals that were subject to HRRP and VBP. A limitation that should be reviewed and
re-analyzed in the future relates to the incomplete nature of the 2015 financial data for
this study, and the various levels of missing data. These are a product of the timing of
the study, and with time, the missing data should be remedied. Future research could
reexamine the 2015 missing data and also investigate what occurred in 2013 to cause
such a large spike for AHCs related to total margin. The insignificance of Medicaid
expansion in this study should be reviewed as well since the findings from the study are
counter to what other research has found, and thus, worth further exploration. Finally,
future research can focus on the hospital characteristics related to structure to better
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understand what changed and how that influenced operating and total margins, over
time. This type of research would lend itself well to qualitative study and working with
select hospitals to understand changes over time.
Overall, this study addressed the question of whether VBP and HRRP affected
AHCs differently from non-AHCs over the period of 2011 through 2015. While the
results did not support the hypotheses, the study’s findings did suggest that there is
something organizationally or in the environment that might be affecting AHCs
differently from non-AHCs. The results suggest that future research should be
conducted to better understand how internal and external factors might be affecting
AHCs differently from non-AHCs so that AHCs may continue to be financially viable and
serve in their unique position in U.S. healthcare.
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